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Be Careful What You Wish For: Legal Sanctions and
Public Safety among Adolescent Felony Offenders in
Juvenile and Criminal Court†
Jeffrey Fagan ∗
Aaron Kupchik **
Akiva Liberman ∗∗∗
Abstract
Three decades of legislative activism have resulted in a broad expansion of states’
authority to transfer adolescent offenders from juvenile to criminal (adult) courts. At the
same time that legislatures have broadened the range of statutes and lowered the age
thresholds for eligibility for transfer, states also have reallocated discretion away from
judges and instituted simplified procedures that permit prosecutors to elect whether
adolescents are prosecuted and sentenced in juvenile or criminal court. These
developments reflect popular and political concerns that relatively lenient or attenuated
punishment in juvenile court violates proportionality principles for serious crimes
committed by adolescents, and is ineffective at deterring or controlling future crimes.
This legislative activism has reshaped the boundaries of the juvenile court, and animated
calls for its elimination. Yet these developments have taken place in a near vacuum of
empirical analysis of the efficacy of these measures to increase punishment or reduce
crime. Jurisprudential analyses of the fit between the traditional doctrines of immaturity
and reduced culpability of juveniles also has lagged far behind the pace of legislative
change. The redrawing of the boundaries of the juvenile court also has not reflected new
knowledge on adolescent development, the legal socialization of adolescents, and their
responsiveness to criminal sanctions. The new boundaries of the juvenile court also
threaten to reify and intensify social and racial dimensions of criminal punishment.
To address these questions, we conducted a natural experiment to assess whether
prosecuting and sentencing adolescent felony offenders in the criminal court leads to
†
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harsher punishment, and whether that harsher punishment translates into improved
public safety. We show that serious adolescent offenders prosecuted in the criminal court
are likely to be rearrested more quickly and more often for violent, property and weapons
offenses, and they are more often and more quickly returned to incarceration.
Adolescents prosecuted and punished in the juvenile court are more likely to be
rearrested for drug offenses. These results suggest that law and policy facilitating
“wholesale waiver” or categorical exclusion of certain groups of adolescents based
solely on offense and age, are ineffective at both specific deterrence of serious crime,
despite political rhetoric insisting the opposite. Such laws may increase the risk of
serious crimes by adolescents and young adults, by heavily mortgaging their possibilities
to deflect their criminal behavioral trajectory and enter a path of prosocial human
development. Returning to a discretionary, judge-centered transfer policy, rather than
“wholesale waiver” or surgical exclusion of entire categories of adolescent offenders,
would limit the number of youth subjected to criminal court prosecution and harsh
punishment conditions in adult corrections. A policy of discretionary transfer of only the
most serious offenders, whose eligibility for transfer would be transparently assessed
with full access to evidence and expertise, would ensure proportional punishment for the
few adolescents whose severe crimes demand greater punishment than is available in the
juvenile court, and whose punishment as juveniles might corrode the legitimacy of the
juvenile court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Tensions at the Borders of Juvenile Justice
Since the creation of the juvenile court a century ago, there have been recurring
debates on the dimensions of age and criminality that comprised its upper boundary. For
the past quarter century, that debate has focused on the most serious offenders in the
juvenile court, especially the most violent among them. There has been consistent
pressure throughout this period to increase the use of adult court for these adolescents. 1
Over the past decade, nearly every state has simplified and expanded eligibility of
adolescent offenders for the adult court. 2 The goal of these efforts is to apply the criminal
court’s jurisprudence of just deserts, harsh punishments, and social stigmatization to an
ever-expanding population of adolescents charged with serious and violent crimes. The
rationales vary from state to state from deterrence to incapacitation to retribution.
Within this debate lingers the controversial and contentious question of exactly
which violent, serious or chronic young offenders should be sentenced and punished as
1

THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (J. Fagan & F.E. Zimring eds., 2000); J.A. Arteaga,
Juvenile InJustice: Congressional Attempts To Abrogate The Procedural Rights Of Juvenile Defendants,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051(2002).
2

BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) [hereinafter FELD,
BAD KIDS]; FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998) [hereinafter ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH];
PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME
(1996). A secondary front in this era of legislative activism has focused on the procedures for selection of which
juvenile offenders are to be transferred. During this era, and most actively in the past decade, every state has
adopted one or more statutory strategies to transfer some chronological juveniles to criminal courts: judicial
waiver, legislative exclusion of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, or prosecutorial choice of forum
between concurrent jurisdictions. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH supra; THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 1; YOUTH IN ADULT COURT (D. Hamparian et al. eds., 1982); B. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Changes]; M. SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOW
JUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT (1994). Each method to decide whether a youth is a criminal or a
delinquent has supporters and detractors. Proponents of judicial waiver emphasize its consistency with juvenile
court sentencing philosophy and contend that individualized judgments provide an appropriate balance of
flexibility and severity. J.A. Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 93 (1990); F. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In Defense
of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1991) [hereinafter Zimring, Hard
Cases]. Critics object that juvenile court judges lack valid or reliable clinical tools with which to assess
“amenability to treatment” or to predict dangerousness, and that the standardless discretion judges exercise
results in abuses and inequalities. B. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teenaged AxeMurderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 J.L. & INEQUALITY 1 (1990) [hereinafter Feld, Bad
Law]; B. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21
CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delinquent Careers]; B. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for
Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515 (1978)
[hereinafter Feld, Unanswerable Questions]. Proponents of legislative waiver endorse “just deserts” retributive
sentencing policies, assert that offense exclusion fosters greater consistency, uniformity, and equality among
similarly situated offenders, and advocate proportional sanctions based on relatively objective characteristics
such as the seriousness of the offense, culpability, or criminal history. Feld, Delinquent Careers, supra; B. Feld,
Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1995)
[hereinafter Feld, Public Policy]. However, critics question whether a legislature practically can remove
discretion from waiver decisions without imposing excessive rigidity or substantially increasing the number of
youths inappropriately transferred to criminal court. F. Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver
[hereinafter Zimring, Jurisprudence of Waiver], in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
TRAINING (J.C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter MAJOR ISSUES]; Zimring, Hard Cases, supra.
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juveniles or adults. Selecting the criteria to define the boundary between juvenile and
criminal court requires a choice between the nominally rehabilitative dispositions of
juvenile courts and the explicitly punitive dispositions of criminal courts. 3 But at what
age? And for which offenses? Accordingly, choosing the criteria for “adulthood”
reflects normative tensions in sentencing policies on the age-specific capacities of
adolescents, their maturity and culpability, and the prospects for developmental and
behavioral change as they chronologically age. Within these tensions, those electing
which jurisdiction must decide, within the context of specific age and offense categories,
whether “just deserts” and the seriousness of the offense determine the forum, or if the
“real needs” of the individual offender should govern the appropriate disposition?
The utilitarian dimension of the debate about waiver policies addresses the more
detailed question of the relative efficacy of juvenile versus criminal court sanctions.
Critics of the juvenile court contend that its rehabilitative treatments are ineffective and
that individualized discretion fosters invidious discrimination among similarly-situated
offenders. 4 Some question whether the juvenile court can either rehabilitate chronic and
violent young offenders at all, or simultaneously protect public safety while doing so. 5
Moreover, critics of a separate juvenile court contend that its judicial preoccupation with
therapy deprecates the moral seriousness of crimes, offers inadequate retribution for
adolescent felony offenders, and fails to deter other offenders. 6 Others contend that
criminal court sanctions provide greater community protection, more effectively deter
future crime, and dispense more proportional, retributive responses to serious crimes. 7
Others argue that the criminal court with its greater procedural safeguards is the more
appropriate forum to adjudicate youths whose serious or chronic criminal behaviors
mandate lengthy incarceration in secure facilities. 8
Supporters of the juvenile court argue that youth violence is a transitory
adolescent behavioral pattern that – for most adolescents – is unlikely to escalate into
more serious or persistent crime. 9 They argue that adolescent offenders can benefit from
the treatment services of the juvenile justice system with minimal threat to public safety
while avoiding the lasting stigma of a criminal conviction. Many proponents of juvenile
court intervention for violent delinquents do not accept the criticisms of rehabilitative
3

F.A. Allen, Preface to THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1; C. Whitebread & R. Batey,
The Role of Waiver in Juvenile Court: Questions of Philosophy and Function, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at
502.
4
MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (K. Kempf-Leonard et al. eds., 1995); B. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of the Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the Difference that it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988)
[hereinafter Feld, Punishment, Treatment].
5
Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
6
WILLIAM BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY...AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST
CRIME AND DRUGS (1996); JAMES Q. WILSON, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983);
M. Wolfgang, Abolish the Juvenile Court System, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 12. T. Hirschi and M. Gottfredson,
Rethinking Juvenile Justice, 39 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 262 (1993).
7
Wilson, supra note 6; Wolfgang, supra note 6, at 12; Hirschi and Gottfredson, id.
8
Feld, Bad Kids, supra note 2; Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth
Violence, in 24 CRIME AND JUSTICE 189 (1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence]; J.E. Ainsworth,
Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991).
9
D.M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., THE VIOLENT FEW (1978); L.W. Shannon, The Prediction Problem and Criminal
Careers, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 117 (1985); Terrie E. Moffitt, Life-Course-Persistent and
Adolescence-Limited Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 674
(1993); Zimring, AMERICAN YOUTH, supra note 2.
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programs, and argue instead that weak evaluation research or poor program quality mask
the natural strengths of juvenile corrections. 10
B. Testing the Borders
Between the poles of this argument, legislators have continued to tinker with the
boundary between juvenile and adult court with little consideration of empirical evidence
of the consequences of waiver policy alternatives in shaping law and policy. 11 Legislators
have been incurious about research that links maturation and other dimensions of
adolescent development to statutory thresholds of the age criminal responsibility, whether
there are offender or offense characteristics that are more responsive to criminal legal
sanctions, and if structural changes that shift discretion from judges to prosecutors
achieve their crime control goals.
Perhaps legislators are right in ignoring research: a recent review conducted by
the Centers for Disease Control confirmed that jurisdictional transfer had iatrogenic
effects on youths tried as adults, and that there was no evidence of a general deterrent
effect among other adolescents from the threat of transfer. 12 Before that, a National
Research Council scientific panel on juvenile crime and juvenile justice concluded that
there is insufficient evidence to claim that either crime control or retributive goals of the
recent cohort of tougher waiver laws have been realized. 13
Yet the available evidence suggests that legislative intentions often are not
realized. For example, while recent changes to waiver policy often are intended to impose
harsher sentences for serious juvenile offenders, this intention may not always be
realized. 14 Some research reports a “punishment gap” in which waived felony property
offenders receive shorter sentences as adults than they could have received in juvenile
court. 15 Increasingly punitive approaches to juvenile offending often are justified on
deterrence grounds, yet violent youths sentenced to adult prisons may emerge even more
hardened and likely to re-offend. 16
Conclusive tests of transfer policies are constrained by ethical and practical limits
of social experimentation. Ethical and public safety concerns rule out experimental
designs where adolescent offenders might be randomly assigned to criminal or juvenile
10

T. PALMER, A PROFILE OF CORRECTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1994); Jeffrey A. Fagan, Natural Experiments, in
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 108 (K. Kempf ed., 1990); Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Forst, Risks, Fixers
and Zeal: Treatment Innovation and Implementation for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 76 PRISON J. 5 (1994);
Mark W. Lipsey, The Effect of Treatment on Juvenile Delinquents: Results from Meta-Analysis, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Friedrich Losel et al. eds., 1992); M.W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency
Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION
(Thomas D. Cook ed., 1992).
11
Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
12
A. McGowan et al., The Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice
System to the Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 34 AM J PREV MED. S7–S28 (2007). See, also, D. Lee
and J. McCrary, Lee, David S. and McCrary, Justin, "Crime, Punishment, and Myopia" (July 2005). NBER
Working Paper No. W11491. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=762770
13
JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE (J. McCord et al. eds., (2001).
14
See, e.g., S.I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY (1996).
15
Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
16
J.A. Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing
Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 101 (2002) [hereinafter Fagan, This Will Hurt]; D.M.
Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE 81 (2002).

2007]

JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN ADULT COURT

4

court. Cross-state comparisons are challenged by variability between states in their age
cutoffs, targeted offenses, and selection mechanisms. 17 As crime rates rise and fall over
time, studies may produce results that are artifacts of particular eras or cutoffs. 18 Data on
the sorting methods by which judges and prosecutors allocate adolescent offenders at the
border to either juvenile or adult court often are unavailable.
Natural variation from state to state, however, may create conditions to study
waiver policy using alternatives to controlled experiments and complicated state-level
panel designs. In this study, we capitalize on a state jurisdictional boundary running
through a single large homogeneous metropolitan area to create a natural experiment.
The differences in judicial forum and punishment across this divide create the conditions
for a natural experiment on the effects of juvenile and criminal jurisdiction on recidivism.
We use a quasi-experimental design to compare similarly situated youths handled
in different systems. Adolescent offenders from spanning contiguous states are assigned
to juvenile or criminal court based on state laws. On one side of the boundary (in New
York), juveniles as young as 13 are charged in the adult court, while on the other side (in
New Jersey) equivalent cases are processed in the juvenile court until age 18. In New
Jersey, these cases could be adjudicated and disposed of in the juvenile courts or waived
to criminal courts (though very few cases are waived – see below). In New York, the
Juvenile Offender Law 19 and its low “adult” age threshold places these cases in the
criminal court. The nesting of a metropolitan area across two contiguous states with
contrasting laws allows us to control for contextual or milieu effects such as urbanism,
normative regional attitudes on crime and punishment, weapon availability, the
prevalence of contributing or mitigating factors such as drug use, and contemporary
statewide political influences from media and popular culture.
The research replicates and extends a prior study by Fagan 20 reporting that
adolescents charged and punished as adults were more likely to be arrested, for more
serious crimes, more quickly and more often, and be returned to incarceration, compared
to a matched sample of juveniles adjudicated and sentenced in the juvenile court. In this
replication. This research expands on the previous study by including a broader range of
eligible offenses, a larger set of communities in each state, alternative measures of the
dependent variable, and alternative statistical tests. As before, we compare the likelihood
of rearrest for different offense types and likelihood of subsequent incarceration
following prosecution in juvenile and criminal courts.

17

See, for example, Steven Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1156 (1998).
Id. (Explain)
19
1978 N.Y. Laws § 481, McKinney's NY-ST-ANN Penal Law § 30.00
18

20

J.A. FAGAN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE COMPARATIVE IMPACTS OF JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL COURT
SANCTIONS ON ADOLESCENT FELONY OFFENDERS (1991) [hereinafter FAGAN, COMPARATIVE IMPACTS]; J.A.
Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 L. & POL’Y 77 (1996) [hereinafter Fagan, Comparative Advantage]; J.A. Fagan,
Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism of Adolescent Felony Offenders [hereinafter Fagan, Men from the Boys], in YOUTH VIOLENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995). In that study, Fagan analyzed the severity and

effectiveness of juvenile and criminal court sanctions for 1,200 adolescent felony offenders, ages 15-16,
arrested for robbery and burglary during 1981-82 and 1986-8720 in matched (and contiguous) counties in
New York and New Jersey where their cases were handled under different statutory regimes.
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II. JURISPRUDENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY ON TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Evolution of the Modern Jurisdictional Boundaries
Since the beginning of English common law, Anglo-American law treated young
offenders differently than adults. 21 They were presumed to be less culpable for their
crimes, owing to their immaturity in judgment, moral reasoning, social experience, and
autonomy. 22 Before the creation of the juvenile court in the U.S., the common law’s
infancy mens rea defense accorded special protections to youths charged with crimes,
acknowledged that children lacked the requisite moral capacity or criminal responsibility
to make blameworthy choices, and presumptively excused those below the age of 14
from criminal punishment. 23 The juvenile court emerged at the end of the nineteenth
century from the reformulation of two ideas: changes in strategies of social control, and
changes in the cultural conceptions of children24 and adolescents. 25
The juvenile court synthesized the newer formulation of childhood with
positivistic assumptions about crime and social control, and designed a specialized,
bureaucratic agency to serve the child offender. Positivist criminology characterized
deviance as determined rather than chosen, and sought to identify its causes. Progressive
reformers “medicalized” delinquency and prescribed the “Rehabilitative Ideal” to treat
it. 26 They envisioned that juvenile court professionals would make discretionary,
individualized treatment decisions in a quasi-clinical setting, and substitute a scientific,
therapeutic preventative approach for the traditional punitive responses of the criminal
law. 27 Dispositions were indeterminate, nonproportional, and continued for the duration
of minority. The juvenile court detained and treated youth in separate correctional

21

B. KRISBERG & J. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE (1993); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000); C.W. Thomas & S. Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1985).
22
Elizabeth Scott & Laurence D. Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003).
23
S.J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659 (1970); Andrew Walkover, The
Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1984).
24
D.J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980); J.E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991).
25
Zimring, AMERICAN YOUTH, supra note 2; Scott, supra note 21; Zimring, Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note
2.
26
F.A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981); P. LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
SOCIAL CONTROL (1984).
27
ROTHMAN, supra note 24; B. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in CRIME AND JUSTICE 197 (M.
Tonry ed., 1993) [hereinafter Feld, American Juvenile Court]; S.J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). In the ideal juvenile court, an expert judge, assisted by social service
personnel and probation officers would investigate the child’s background, identify the sources of the child’s
misconduct, and develop a treatment plan to meet the child’s needs. Because their aims were benevolent, their
solicitude individualized, and their intervention guided by science, juvenile court judges enjoyed enormous
discretion to make dispositions in the “best interests of the child.” They attributed minor significance to the
specific crime a child committed because it indicated little about a child’s “real needs.” The misdeeds that
brought a child before the court affected neither the intensity nor the duration of intervention because each child
differed and no limits could be defined in advance.
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facilities to prevent their contamination by adult criminals. 28 Theoretically, juvenile
courts subordinated concern for retributive punishment to the individualized
rehabilitation of the child. 29
The formal segregation of juveniles institutionalized the fundamental legal
distinctions between children and adults30, and implicitly recognized the difficulty of
convicting and punishing juveniles in the adult criminal justice system. 31 By separating
children, usually defined as those below eighteen years of age, from adults and providing
a rehabilitative alternative to punishment, juvenile courts rejected both the criminal law’s
jurisprudence and its procedural safeguards such as juries and lawyers. Court personnel
used informal procedures and a euphemistic vocabulary to eliminate any stigma or
implication of a criminal proceeding. 32
Within this new jurisprudence of adolescent crime, juvenile court judges were
given the discretion to deny some young offenders the court’s protections and transfer
them to adult criminal courts. 33 Although the very existence of the juvenile court
embodied the assumption that most youths lacked criminal responsibility, waiver
legislation recognized that some young offenders could be culpable and were deserving
of adult punishment. The possibility of transfer operated as a “safety valve” to enable the
juvenile court to scapegoat occasional serious offenders and simultaneously preserve its
broader jurisdiction. 34 The option to transfer some highly visible or serious cases to adult
courts also muted political criticism of juvenile courts during its early years. 35
A series of U.S. Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960’s introduced
procedural formality and accountability into juvenile court proceedings. Juveniles facing
transfer to the criminal court were accorded substantive and procedural rights in Kent v.
United States. 36 Historically, all transfer decisions were made by juvenile court judges,
either sui generis or on motion of the prosecutor; eligibility for transfer was regulated
neither by statute nor case law. Over time, eligibility for transfer fell under the regulatory
purview of the state legislatures to include only certain types of offenses or offenders. 37
The criteria generally combined factors including age and type of offense, and the
decision was not reviewable. The Kent Court ruled that waiver was a legal proceeding
that was subject to due process protections, and could not be made based solely on the
discretion of the judge, and that the court should promote standards to guide the transfer
28

ROTHMAN, supra note 24; S. Schlossman, Juvenile Justice: History and Philosophy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE (S.H. Kadish ed., 1983); F. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the Jurisprudence of
Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (M.K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
29
ROTHMAN, supra note 24.
30
Ainsworth, supra note 24.
31
T.J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992).
32
A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (2d ed. 1977); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4; Schlossman, supra
note 28.
33
ROTHMAN, supra note 24, at 285; D.S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at
42.
34
M.A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME
& DELINQ. 53 (1986); Feld, Unanswerable Questions, supra note 2; D.S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer
Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 13.
35
MICHAEL WILRICH, CITY OF COURTS (2002).
36
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37
R.O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 45.
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decision and make it fair and consistent. 38 The Supreme Court declined to state what
standards should apply, deferring to the individual states. 39 However, in an Appendix to
the decision, the Kent Court “suggested” several facts that should be considered by
judges when making waiver decisions. 40 In addition to its historic and procedural
significance, Kent also had substantive implications that we discuss in the next section.
In 1967, the Supreme Court in In re Gault mandated procedural safeguards in
delinquency adjudications, and began to alter juvenile court operations. 41 The Supreme
Court subsequently elaborated on the procedural and functional equivalence between
criminal and delinquency proceedings. In In re Winship, the Court held that juvenile
courts must establish delinquency “beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than by the lower
standards of proof in civil trials.42 Similarly, in Breed v. Jones the Court held that the
protections of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited adult
re-prosecution of a youth previously convicted on the same charges in juvenile court. 43
The Court did not extend to juveniles all the criminal procedural safeguards available to
adults. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court denied to juveniles a constitutional right

38

Kent, 383 U.S. 541.
Id.
40
The Kent Court referred to a 1959 policy memorandum from the U.S. District court suggesting principles to
guide judges in making transfer decisions. See id. at 565. The memorandum states:
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in deciding whether the Juvenile
Court's jurisdiction over such offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the
community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful
manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to
offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury
may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the juvenile's
associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home,
environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid
Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of
the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
39

41

387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile court and rejected the traditional
rationales for denying procedural safeguards to juveniles. The Court observed that “unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure” and concluded that
the denial of procedural rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than “careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment.” Id. at 18—19. The Gault Court mandated elementary procedural safeguards because
juvenile courts often failed to realize the Progressives’ ideals. These safeguards included the right to advance
notice of charges, the right to a fair and impartial hearing, the right to the assistance of counsel, the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
42
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
43
421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975).
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to jury trials in state delinquency proceedings, and halted the extension of full parity with
adult criminal defendants. 44
Despite the Court’s reluctance in McKeiver to hasten the demise of the juvenile
court system, its earlier decisions in Gault and Winship drastically altered the form and
function of the juvenile court. By emphasizing procedural regularity as a prerequisite to
a delinquency disposition, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the juvenile court from
the “real needs” of a child to proof of criminal guilt. Those decisions provided the
impetus for the continuing procedural and substantive convergence between juvenile and
criminal courts. 45 Judicial and legislative changes in recent years have formalized
juvenile court procedures and strengthened the punitive element of juvenile court
sanctions. 46 The sentences that delinquents receive increasingly reflect the idea of
deserved punishments rather than their “real needs.” Proportional and determinate
sentences based on the current offense and prior record, mandatory minimum terms of
confinement, and correctional and parole release guidelines evidence the shift in juvenile
court sentencing jurisprudence from treatment to punishment. 47
Despite the trend toward reconciliation of sentencing logic in juvenile and
criminal courts, a clear border between the two courts remained, even after these
landmark decisions. Juvenile courts in this era avoided determinacy in dispositions,
retained limits on the age of jurisdiction for juvenile corrections, and continued to feature
treatment rhetoric in its decision making, all the while drifting toward determinacy and
making punishment a more visible and prominent factor in dispositional decision
making. 48 These efforts were designed not to alter the interior logic of the juvenile court,
for the “toughening” of the juvenile court developed from within, a function perhaps of
recurring criticisms of its efficacy and attacks on its organizational boundaries. Whatever
the growing similarities in jurisprudence and law-in-action between juvenile and adult
court, the stark differences in the conditions of confinement between juvenile and
criminal court sharply delineated the institutional expressions of the separate punishment
philosophies. 49 Thus, efforts to dissolve or move the border between the two courts were
laden with more than symbolic differences. The attack on the juvenile court’s boundaries
and jurisdiction threatened to catapult large numbers of adolescent offenders toward a far
harsher correctional fate. This incremental shrinking of the juvenile court’s borders was
a long march that began in the 1980s and accelerated through the next two decades.

44

403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). McKeiver held that the due process standard of “fundamental fairness” in juvenile
proceedings emphasized “accurate fact-finding,” which a judge could provide as readily as a jury. Id. at 543.
The McKeiver Court also expressed concern that to require jury trials would disrupt juvenile court practices,
subvert the traditional “treatment” rationale of the juvenile court, and provide support to eliminate juvenile
courts. Id. at 547.
45
Feld, American Juvenile Court, supra note 27.
46
Id.; B. Feld, The Decision to Seek Criminal Charges: Just Desserts and the Waiver Decision, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 27 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Just Desserts]; B. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4.
47
Ainsworth, supra note 24; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4; Feld, American Juvenile Court, supra
note 27; M.R. Podkopacz & B.C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, ‘Blended Sentencing’, and the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001).
48
J.A. Fagan, Punishment or Treatment for Adolescent Offenders? Therapeutic Integrity and the Paradoxical
Effects of Punishment, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 502 (1999).
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B. Redefining the Boundary between Juvenile and Criminal Jurisdictions
Despite this criminalizing of the juvenile court, however, legislators and policy
makers devoted most of their attention not to changes within the juvenile court, but
instead to redefine and lower (in age and offense severity) the boundary between the two
courts. Rapid increases in juvenile crime rates, especially violent crime, in the 1970s and
again in the late 1980s challenged the juvenile court’s rationale. 50 Youth violence and
the juvenile court’s responses to it are especially important bellwethers that inform crime
control policies generally and weigh heavily on these legislative deliberations. 51 Recent
increases in youth violence frighten citizens and politicians even more than do increases
in the overall volume of crime, 52 and motivated a steady legislative movement to restrict
the scope of the juvenile court.
Legislatures continually redefine the forum in which to adjudicate felony crimes
by adolescents. Since 1978, nearly every state has amended its laws to restrict the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and transfer more cases to adult courts. 53 Some states
49

Fagan, This Will Hurt, supra note 14; M.A Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and State Training Schools:
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy For Adolescents, 39 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1
(1989).
50
Criticisms of juvenile court responses to serious youth crime take several forms. Rising rates of violence place
the juvenile court’s parens patriae philosophy in direct conflict with the perceived threats to public safety and
social order. Critics of the juvenile court have linked increases in youth crime to evaluation research appearing
since the 1960s that consistently reported the ineffectiveness of rehabilitative programs. D. LIPTON ET AL., THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS (1975); THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (L.
Sechrest et al. eds., 1979); W. Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 153 (1966); S. Lab & J.T. Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile Correctional
Treatment, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 60 (1988); J.O. Robison & G.W. Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67 (1971); W. Wright & M. Dixon, Community Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 35 (1975). These negative findings
undermined the juvenile court’s positivistic assumptions that treatment could curtail further offending.
51
J.A. Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 93
(1990); Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2; Zimring, AMERICAN YOUTH, supra note 2; Franklin E. Zimring &
Jeffrey Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1,
at 407. Some argue that juvenile courts sentence youth convicted of serious crimes inconsistently and too
leniently. That is, the statutory limitations on punishment in juvenile court have been assailed as inappropriate
given the public danger from juvenile violence. Compared with the lengthy sentences imposed in criminal
courts, short-term juvenile court sanctions may inappropriately increase the risks to public safety by quickly
releasing youths from secure incarceration. By failing to curtail further crime and violence, rehabilitative
dispositions in the juvenile court appear to provide weak social controls, fail to protect the community from
“dangerous” offenders and thereby threaten public safety, disregard the harm to the victim, and deprecate the
normative condemnation of serious crime. However, punishing some juveniles as adults to protect public safety
is tantamount to the quarantine of persons with deadly and easily transmitted diseases. P. Robinson, Hybrid
Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19 (1987); A. von Hirsch, Hybrid
Principles in Allocating Sanctions: A Reply to Professor Robinson, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 64 (1987). We tolerate
quarantines to limit harms to others, and safety concerns in this example are paramount to justice. However, the
prediction of future crimes by those waived rests, like other predictions, on shaky grounds. A. von Hirsch,
Selective Incapacitation Reexamined: The National Academy of Sciences’ Report on Criminal Careers and
“Career Criminals,” 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 19 (1988).
52
FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2; A. Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995); P. Strasburg, Recent Trends in Serious Juvenile Crime, in OP. CIT. (R. Mathias et
al. eds., 1984).
53
H.N. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT (1999); TORBET
ET AL., supra note 2; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating
and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 128 (2003); Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Court, supra note 19.
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have lowered the age of jurisdiction for criminal court either for all offenders or for
selected offense categories. 54 Other states have expanded the bases to transfer of cases
from juvenile to criminal court jurisdictions either by redefining or expanding the criteria
for transfer, or shifting the burden of proof from the state to the defendant. 55 Still others
have established concurrent jurisdiction for selected offenses or offenders and given
prosecutors broad discretion to select the forum in which to adjudicate and sanction
adolescent offenders. 56
Historically, most states subjected youth to criminal liability at eighteen years of
57
age and exempted offenders below the age of majority from criminal responsibility.
However, the criteria or standards to determine the appropriate judicial forum to sanction
young offenders varied considerably from state to state. 58 States vary in their generic
definition of the age of criminal court jurisdiction – eighteen, seventeen, or sixteen.
Moreover, recent legislative changes reflect broader sentencing policy trends as
legislators use “just deserts” and the principle of the offense to excise serious crimes from
juvenile court jurisdiction. 59 Perhaps the most extreme example is New York, where
youths fourteen or older charged with any of seventeen felony offenses are prosecuted in
criminal court under the Juvenile Offender Law, as are youths as young as thirteen
charged with murder. Some states, including New York, allow for “reverse waiver” of
adolescents from criminal court back to juvenile court. Accordingly, the reduction of the
age of majority for certain classes of offenses or offenders creates an age-behavior
gradient for legal definitions of childhood. 60
However, this distinction between punishment and treatment provides one of two
This
fundamental justifications for separate juvenile and criminal systems. 61
interventionist rationale translated into a philosophy of forceful intrusion into children’s

54

SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 53.
Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
56
Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 21; D.M. Bishop et. al., Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable
Reform, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 179 (1989); D. Bishop & C. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A
Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281 (1991).
57
Zimring, Jurisprudence of Waiver, supra note 2.
58
YOUTH IN ADULT COURT, supra note 2; SICKMUND, supra note 2; Feld, American Juvenile Court, supra note
27; C.J. Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986).
59
FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2. For example, legislation in many
states set an age boundary that is mediated by specific crimes -- the 16 year-old offender who commits a violent
offense may be prosecuted criminally. SICKMUND, supra note 2. Nearly one-third of the states have redefined
juvenile court jurisdiction to exclude certain offenses or offense-offender categories and thereby confer
“automatic adulthood” on youths charged with these crimes. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 19;
Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Feld, American Juvenile Court, supra note 27.
60
J.P. Conrad, Crime and the Child, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2, at 179.
61
Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 4. Because the juvenile court views offenders below the threshold
age for “adulthood,” or criminal liability, as “amenable to treatment” and not responsible for their crimes, it
intervenes to ameliorate the antecedent conditions which gave rise to youthful misconduct and retain state
control. Criminal justice sanctions, by contrast, attempt to deter future crimes, incapacitate offenders to prevent
further crimes, or simply impose retribution. The type and severity of punishment ostensibly is determined
primarily by the seriousness of the crime committed, moderated by the defendant’s criminal history, mitigating
circumstances and background. While most adult correctional systems make some efforts to provide basic social
skills, e.g., education and job training, to forestall further crime, these are adjuncts to the punishment. In the
juvenile system, by contrast, the delivery of services theoretically constitutes the substance of the legal sanction.
55
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and their families’ lives to resolve the underlying factors thought to cause delinquency. 62
The broad definition of delinquency allowed the Juvenile Court to reach broadly and
exercise a wide range of powers. This tradition was intrinsic to the jurisprudence of the
juvenile court for nearly a century, a jurisprudence that tolerates, indeed encourages,
differential responses to similarly situated offenders because their underlying factors,
social conditions, or mitigating circumstances differ. 63 The retributive and deterrent
emphases of the criminal court encourage exactly the opposite, and directly challenge the
politically naïve and materially arrogant ideal of “rehabilitation.”
A second justification was the avoidance of stigma. This diversionary
justification for the modern juvenile court was always the more important of the two, and
evidence of the adverse effects of transfer suggests that it remains so today. 64 In the early
days of the juvenile court, this rationale was more widely accepted than the
interventionist vision. 65 Avoidance of the stigma of criminal conviction (as an adult) was
designed to keep young offenders separated physically to prevent their abuse and
exploitation, psychologically to avoid their corrupting influence. The process itself was
thought by early reformers to be harmful, with young offenders feared by reformers such
as Judge Tuthill to become internally branded as criminals. 66 Given “room to reform,” 67
the preferred punishment for adolescents was in the juvenile court, where they could
avoid the “disfiguring” punishments of the adult courts. The diversionary rationale also
avoids the stigma of a felony conviction whose consequences may interfere with entry
into the workforce and lower wages over the lifecourse. 68 In addition to economic
disenfranchisement, a felon is disqualified from jury service, 69 the right to vote, 70 and the
right to hold elective office. 71

62

Tanenhaus, Evolution of Early Juvenile Courts, supra note 33. Intervention took several forms,
including ordering a minimum standard of hygiene and appearance. Thus, at times, courts ordered children
to bathe and to wear clean clothes.

63

64

ALLEN, supra note 26; Allen, supra note 3.

See, Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 14; Fagan, This Will Hurt,
supra note 14.
65
F. E. Zimring, The Common Thread, supra note 28.
66
Zimring, The Common Thread, id. See, also, Richard S. Tuthill, History of the Children’s Court in
Chicago, in CHILDREN’S COURTS IN THE U.S.: THEIR ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS, Jane Addams
(ed.) (1904).
67
There is overwhelming evidence that most adolescents are unlikely to sustain juvenile crime beyond their
teenage years given opportunities for change via natural maturation or through the benefits of effective
intervention programs. See e.g. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE
(1981); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In Defense of
Discretionary Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1991); ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH,
supra note 2, at 69-87.
68
Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Economic Status of Disadvantaged Young Men, in URBAN LABOR
MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 215-226 (George E. Peterson & Wayne Vroman eds., 1992); John
Hagan, The Social Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1993).
69
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21–201 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West
1999); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 510 (McKinney 1999); N.M. STAT. § 38-5-1; TEX. STAT. § 62-102
70
See e.g., FLA. CONST. ART. VI, § 4; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-904
71
See e.g., FLA. CONST. ART. VI, § 4; MINN. CONST. ART. VII, §§ 1, 6 ; N.C. CONST. ART. VI, § 8
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C. The Limited Research on the Consequences of Waiver
For nearly three decades, legislative activism to narrow or eliminate juvenile court
jurisdiction over adolescent felony offenders has continued, yet there has been little
systematic research to determine if youth receive more severe or consistent sanctions in
criminal court, or if their punishment as adults reduces their recidivism. Thus, a social
experiment that each year affects at least 200,000 adolescents below the age of 18 72 has
gone largely unevaluated. The few studies that have been completed thus far find little
empirical support for the policy rationales or goals of contemporary transfer policies.
1. Impacts on Punishment: Closing the Leniency Gap
Whether the criminalization of adolescent felony crime has resulted in more
certain or severe sanctions is not at all clear and seems contingent on type of offense. 73
With all of the varied legislative responses to youth crime, few studies have compared
sanctioning patterns in juvenile and criminal court. Because of the difficulty of avoiding
selection bias, 74 there have been few valid tests of the comparative certainty or severity
of sanctions, or of the deterrent or incapacitative effects of juvenile and criminal court
sanctions for adolescent felony offenders. There also is little evidence that reducing the
age of majority has had a general deterrent effect on aggregate adolescent crime rates. 75
For example, Roysher and Edelman 76 examined dispositions and placements
under the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 77 which relocates original jurisdiction to the
criminal court for many first and second degree felony offenses committed by youths
fourteen or fifteen years of age (and thirteen for homicide). They found that sanctions
were no more severe in criminal court, and in many cases were actually less harsh. 78 But
other studies report that juveniles sentenced in criminal court are treated more severely

72

See H.N. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS, supra note 53; TORBET ET AL., supra
note 2; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing
Juveniles as Adults, supra note 53.
73
See D.M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME &
DELINQ. 171 (1996); Fagan, This Will Hurt, supra note 14; A. Kupchik et al., Punishment, Proportionality and
Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypotheses, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 57 (2003).
74
FAGAN, COMPARATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 17; Fagan, Comparative Advantage, supra note 17.
75
See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 12; E.L. Jensen & L.K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative
Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96 (1994); E. Risler et al., Evaluating the Georgia
Legislative Waiver’s Effectiveness in Deterring Juvenile Crime, 8 RES. SOC. WORK PRAC. 657 (1998); S.I. Singer
& D. McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 521 (1988).
76
M. Roysher & P. Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does it Mean and How is it
Working?, in MAJOR ISSUES, supra note 2.
77
In 1978, New York State enacted legislation that placed original jurisdiction to the criminal court for specific
felony offenses committed by youths below 16 years of age. This statute was known as the Juvenile Offender
Law, and the offenders it covered were called “JOs.” See S.I. Singer & C.P. Ewing, Juvenile Justice Reform in
New York State: The Juvenile Offender Law, 8 LAW & POL’Y 457 (1986); Singer & McDowall, supra note 65;
M. Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act: Effectiveness and Impact on New York’s Criminal Justice System, 26
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 677 (1981).
78
See also YOUTH IN ADULT COURT, supra note 2; Bortner, supra note 34; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note
2; L.K. Gillespie & M.D. Norman, Does Certification Mean Prison? Some Preliminary Findings From Utah, 35
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 23 (1984).
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than are their counterparts in juvenile court, via relatively harsh sanctions and low case
attrition. 79
There are several explanations for a possible “leniency gap,” in which adolescents
might face harsher sanctions in juvenile court than in criminal court. 80 Young offenders
in criminal court may appear less threatening than their older counterparts with longer
records. Qualitative differences between juveniles’ and adults’ offenses, a lack of
integration between juvenile and adult criminal records, and differences between juvenile
court waiver criteria and criminal court sentencing practices contribute to this anomalous
gap in social control. 81 In many jurisdictions, criminal courts rely primarily on the
seriousness of a young adult’s present offense and prior adult criminal history when
imposing sentences. The juvenile component of offenders’ criminal history often is not
available because of the confidentiality of juvenile court records, the functional and
physical separation of juvenile and criminal court staffs who must compile and combine
these records, and sheer bureaucratic ineptitude. 82
Yet there is consistent evidence that adolescents charged with and waived for
violent crimes receive substantial sentences as adults. 83 For example, Rudman et al.,
looking only at adolescents charged with violent crimes, found that the criminal court
was more punitive. 84 Sanctions were equally certain in juvenile and criminal court, but
juveniles waived to criminal court received harsher sanctions since there was no age
limitation on sentence length for adult offenders. Forst, Fagan, and Vivona found that
compared to youths in training schools, juveniles sentenced and incarcerated as adults
were more likely to be sexually and physically assaulted while incarcerated, and less
likely to receive basic education and job training services. 85 If increased retributivism
was the policy goal of waiver proponents, they got far more than they ever could have
wished for. 86
Thus, the age-offense relationship apparently produces a peculiar disjunction in the
sentences of juveniles as adults. The highly discretionary nature of individualized waiver
decisions and the inconsistency between the criteria for transfers from juvenile court and
criminal court sentencing practices produce a “lack of fit.” When sentenced as adults,
young property offenders may receive shorter sentences than do their juvenile
counterparts, though youth waived for violent offenses may receive dramatically longer
sentences and under more punitive conditions than do their juvenile counterparts. 87
2. Impacts on Recidivism
There has been little systematic research comparing the deterrent effects of
juvenile and criminal court sanctions on recidivism of adolescent offenders. Even so, the
79

E.g., M. Houghtalin & G.L. Mays, Criminal Dispositions of New Mexico Juveniles Transferred to Adult Court,
37 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1991); Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 21.
80
P.W. GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCING SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS (1984).
81
Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Feld, Bad Law, supra note 2.
82
Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 2; Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
83
See SICKMUND, supra note 2; SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 53; Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2.
84
Rudman et al., supra note 58.
85
M.A. Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and State Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the
Treatment-Custody Dichotomy for Adolescents, 39 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989).
86
Fagan, This Will Hurt, supra note 14.
87
Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 8.
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few studies comparing the effects on public safety of waiver to criminal court vesus
retention in juvenile court point in the same direction. 88
Typically, these studies compare samples of youths transferred from juvenile to
adult jurisdiction within a single jurisdiction, introducing sample selection biases that
confound comparisons of the two types of proceedings and sanctions. Others compare
offenders from different jurisdictions, introducing important contextual influences that
interact with the deterrent effects of punishment. 89
Only three studies have
systematically compared recidivism rates for adolescents sentenced as juveniles or adults,
addressing the methodological problems in earlier studies. Despite these limitations, In
the Minnesota study, 58% of the transferred youths committed new offenses within two
years of conviction, compared to 42% of the youths retained in the juvenile court, a
statistically significant difference. 90 Offenses were more serious among the waived
sample: over 85% were convicted of felony offenses against persons or property,
compared to 63% of the waived sample. The frequency of new offenses was higher for
the waived sample as well. The analysis did not control for the sorting process used by
prosecutors to refer juveniles for transfer to the adult court. Accordingly, the transferred
population had substantively different and more serious prior incarceration records
compared to the retained youths, in terms of both prior offenses and failures in prior
treatment efforts. 91 Thus, prosecutorial selection in this case may serve as a proxy for
criminal propensity, and the differences between the samples may reflect more about that
propensity than the differential effects of court jurisdiction. But two other possible
explanations are offered for the elevated recidivism rates of the criminal court population:
socialization to criminal norms and learning criminal skills in adult correctional
institutions, and therapeutic returns of juvenile corrections interventions.
This
explanation is consistent with other studies that illustrate differences in substantive
punishment between juvenile and adult corrections. 92
The Florida study shows a similar pattern of higher offending rates for youths
transferred to the adult court. 93 This study used a case matching procedure to control for
the selection and sorting processes that allocate adolescents to the juvenile or adult court.
Cases were matched on seven criteria: (1) most serious offense for which the transfer was
made, (2) the number of counts included in the bill of information for the committing
offense, (3) the number of prior referrals to the juvenile court, (4) the most serious prior
offense, (5) age at the time of the committing offense, (6) gender, and (7) race (coded
dichtomously as white or non-white). The matching process is critical to the validity of
statistical inferences of sample differences that exclude selection bias. 94 Matches were
successful for the first six variables, but transfers including matches for race were less
88

See, McGowan et al., Effects of Violence Laws and Policies, supra note 11.

89. John C. Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing
Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstien et al. eds., 1983); see also
CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980); Charles R. Tittle,
Evaluationg the Deterrent Effects of Criminal Sanctions, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION 381
(Malcolm Klein & Kathie Teilmann eds., 1980).
90. See Podkapacz & Feld, End of the Line, supra note 85, at 490.
91. Id. at 491.
92. Cf. Forst, supra note 95.
93. See Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 182.
94. Jeffrey A. Fagan, Natural Experiments, in MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 108 (Kimberly L. Kempf
ed., 1990).
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successful. Only two-thirds of the white transfers could be matched to white
nontransfers, and only about half of the non-white transfers could be matched to nonwhite nontransfers. 95 When the race criterion was relaxed, successful matches were
obtained in 92% of the cases.
Recidivism rates were far higher for transferred cases within the first three years
following conviction: 30% of the transferred youths were rearrested, compared to 19% of
the juvenile court sample. 96 But in a seven year follow-up, rearrest rates were
comparable for the two groups: 42% of the transfers were rearrested, compared to 43% of
the juvenile court sample. 97 The difference in long-term recidivism rates was not
significant. However, differences for specific offense types were evident. Recidivism
rates were higher for nontransferred felony property offenders; there were no differences
for cases involving felony violence. For all other crime categories, rearrest rates were
higher over the longer follow-up period for transferred cases. 98 Using multivariate
analysis to control for the matching criteria, there was a weak but statistically significant
effect of transfer on rearrest: after controlling for offense and offender characteristics,
transferred cases were 1.59 times more likely to be rearrested over the follow-up
period. 99
Analyses of time to first rearrest showed that rearrest risks were higher for
transferred cases during the first 1,500 days of the follow-up period, but the risks were no
different thereafter. 100 Using survival analysis to characterize differences in the time to
rearrest, and controlling for offense types, transferred cases were more likely to be
rearrested over the follow-up period for all offense types except property offenses. The
authors conclude that, similar to the short-term follow-up, this longer-term follow-up
showed that “transfer was more likely to aggravate recidivism than to stem it.” 101
The natural experiment comparing adolescents from New York and New Jersey
produced similar results. 102 In this study, recidivism rates were computed for adolescent
felony offenders adjudicated in juvenile court in New Jersey with matched cases
sentenced in the adult court in New York. For robbery offenders, rearrest rates were
higher for cases adjudicated in the criminal courts (chi-square = 6.757, p < .009).103
However, rearrest rates did not differ for burglary offenders by court jurisdiction. The
pattern for reincarceration was similar. Robbery cases in the criminal court cohort were
reincarcerated more often (56.2%) than the juvenile court robbery cohort (40.9%) (chisquare = 16.56, p < .001). 104 There were no significant differences in reincarceration
rates for burglary offenders.
The annualized rate of rearrest offending was computed for offenders with at least
one rearrest (for a new criminal violation). 105 Differences between juvenile and criminal
95. Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles To Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the
Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 548, 550 (1997) [hereinafter Winner et al., Reexamining Recidivism].
96. See Bishop et al., supra note 83, at 182.
97. See Winner et al., supra note 114, at 551.
98. Id. at 552.
99. Id. at 553.
100. Id. at 556.
101. Id. at 558.
102. See Fagan, supra note 31.
103. Id. at 92.
104. Id. at 93.
105. The re-offending rearrest rates were calculated by annualizing total arrests over the time at risk during the
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court cases mirrored the patterns observed for other crime indicators. There were
significant differences in rearrest rates for robbery offenders in criminal court compared
to robbery offenders in juvenile court (2.85 rearrests per year at risk versus 1.67 rearrests
per year at risk) (F=11.24, p < .001). There were no significant differences in the rates
for burglary offenders by court jurisdiction. 106
Another comparison examined the number of days until rearrest. This measure,
called failure time or survival analysis, 107 showed that for robbery offenders in the
criminal court, rearrests occurred at an average of 457 days after first release to the street,
compared to 553 days for robbery offenders in the juvenile court (F=4.662, p < .05). For
burglary offenders, there was no significant difference between juvenile and criminal
court cases. A Cox regression model was used to assess the effects of court jurisdiction
and sentence length on the hazard of rearrest within three years of street time, controlling
for the effects of case (offense and offender) characteristics. 108 The parameters showed
that the hazard of (or risk of) rearrest was 29% lower for adolescents sentenced in the
juvenile court compared to criminal court cases, after controlling for sentence length.109
When specific types of rearrest were considered, the same comparative advantage was
observed for juvenile court sanctions for violent offenses, for other felony offenses, and
for misdemeanors. Only for drug offenses did the model show a comparative advantage
for criminal court punishment. 110 Finally, tests of interactions of sentence length by court
jurisdiction yielded no significant effects. 111
Thus, the comparative advantage of juvenile court sanctions in controlling crime
among adolescent felony offenders seems to reflect its unique correctional context, and is
independent of the length of punishment. The substantive dimensions of punishment in
adult correctional facilities offers an important clue to explaining the increase in crime
propensity among adolescents that follows punishment as an adult and with adults.
Increasing the length of confinement offers no return to crime control for this population.
Moreover, punishment in the adult correctional system seems to raise the risk of rearrest,
an iatrogenic effect that contradicts the predictions of deterrence theory. There is a
consistent pattern of higher rates of criminal offending among adolescents punished as
adults compared to adolescents punished as juveniles. 112 These results were obtained
follow-up period. Time reincarcerated was excluded from the re-offending “window.” Incarceration times for
subsequent convictions were determined using the same procedures for calculating minimum sentences. Suspended
sentences were not included in the calculation of subsequent incarceration times. Sentences to time served were
estimated by computing the interval between the rearrest date and the sentencing date for the rearrest event. Id. at
nn.15–16.
106. See Fagan, supra note 31, at 93.
107. PETER SCHMIDT & ANNE DRYDEN WITTE, PREDICTING RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1989).
108. Hazard models estimate the probability that an individual will fail during a given time period. Hazard
analyses simultaneously estimate the likelihood of two dimensions of recidivism: its prevalence during a given time
period, and the interval until rearrest occurs. The Cox procedure permits testing of specific hypotheses by including
covariates in the model and testing for their significance against a model with no predictors. See David R. Cox,
Regression Models and Life Tables, 34 J. OF THE ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 187 (1972); PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY
ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR LONGITUDINAL DATA (1984); WILLIAM R. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1990).
109. The percent reduction in hazard of rearrest is based on the exponentiated coefficient [Exp (B)]. An Exp (B)
is computed for each independent variable. It indicates the percentage change in the hazards of rearrest associated with
a unit change in that independent variable.
110. See Fagan, supra note 31, at 96–98.
111. Id. at 99.
112. Criminological research cites several noteworthy examples of iatrogenic effects of criminal sanctions.
Assailants in misdemeanor domestic violence cases who are arrested are rearrested more often and more quickly than a
randomly assigned control group who were warned and released by police. The effect was specific to offenders with
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across a range of sampling and measurement conditions, and the effects were identified
using different analytic methods. Whatever the symbolic gains from sentencing
adolescents as adults, these gains are discounted, if not reversed, by the increased public
safety risks of substantive punishment of juveniles as adults.

D. Summary
Two decades of legislative activism have sharply increased the number of
juveniles prosecuted as adults and sentenced to adult criminal punishments. According to
Bishop, these studies showed that many of them are below the age of 17, had no history
of violence that would pose a public safety threat, and were convicted of nonviolent or
misdemeanor crimes. The increase in transfer has disproportionately affected minority
youths, well in excess of their contribution to the population of adolescent offenders.
Reviewing two decades of research on transfer, Bishop condemns the “recent and
substantial expansion of transfer” as harmful and ineffective, 113 while Redding says that
“[t]he short-term benefits gained from transfer and imprisonment may be outweighed by
the longer-term costs of (increased) criminal justice system processing” from higher
recidivism rates. 114 The convergence in this body of research, despite differences in
sampling, measurement and analytic methods among the studies, suggests that policies
promoting transfer adolescents from juvenile to criminal court often fail at deterring
crime among the affected individuals, and may actually worsen public safety risks. The
weight of empirical evidence strongly suggests that there are no general deterrent effects
of increasing the scope of transfer on the incidence generally of serious juvenile crime. 115
Nor are there marginal specific deterrent effects on offending rates of youths transferred
to and sentenced in the adult court. In fact, Bishop shows that in two studies, juveniles
prosecuted as adults had higher rates of rearrest for serious felony crimes such as robbery
and assault, were rearrested more quickly, and were more often returned to
incarceration. 116
The broad reach of new transfer laws and policies captures both those whose
crimes and reoffending risks may merit harsher punishment, but also many more who are
neither chronic nor serious offenders, pose little risk of future offending, and who seem to
be damaged by their exposure to the adult court. Whatever the gains of short-term
“low stakes in conformity,” as measured by their employment (unemployed) and marital (unmarried, cohabitating)
status. See LAWRENCE SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1992); Lawrence Sherman et al., From Initial
Deterrence to Long-term Escalation: Short Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY
821 (1991). Misdemeanor domestic violence assailants who received temporary restraining orders were rearrested
more often compared to a matched sample who were given no such orders. See Adelle Harrell et al., Court Processing
and the Effects of Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence Victims, Grant 90-12L-E-089 (State Justice Institute May
1993) (final report). Drug offenders receiving prison sentences were more likely to be rearrested and were rearrested
sooner, compared to a matched sample of drug offenders who received non-custodial sentences, controlling for
characteristics of the offense and offender. See Jeffrey Fagan, Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Drug Offenders?, in
DRUGS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVES 188 (Doris MacKenzie & Craig Uchida eds.,
1994).
113

D. Bishop & C. Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 1; Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, in 27 CRIME & JUSTICE 81
(2000).
114
Redding, supra note 53, at 143.
115
But see S. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156 (1998).
116
Bishop, supra note 84.
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incapacitation, they may be more than offset by the iatrogenic and toxic effects of adult
punishment for the larger group of adolescent offenders.
To test these questions, we conducted a natural experiment comparing sanctions
and recidivism of youths prosecuted in juvenile versus criminal court. By sampling
across two states, the current research project avoids many of the sample selection
problems inherent to working within a single state. Rather than drawing samples from
populations that have been sorted by decision-makers on a case-by-case basis, or that are
processed during different time periods, we compare similar cases across jurisdictions
with disparate boundaries between criminal and juvenile courts. We compared the
outcomes of adolescent offenders arrested and charged with the same offenses in the
criminal court than in juvenile court. We hypothesize that these serious adolescent
offenders will receive more a punitive response in the criminal court, taking longer in the
court process between arrest and sentencing, being detained more often, more often
adjudicated guilty of the original charge, more often incarcerated, and incarcerated for
longer periods.

III. RESEARCH METHODS
A. Study Design
This research compares case outcomes and criminal histories for adolescents
(ages 15-16) charged in 1992-93 in juvenile courts or in criminal courts with felony
robbery, assault and burglary. The juvenile court cases are sampled from three northern
New Jersey counties, and the criminal court cases from matched counties in New York
City. This study utilizes a natural experiment where equivalent cases from a
homogeneous social area are adjudicated in courts where the jurisprudential forum, and
therefore sanctioning system, is the primary independent variable. That is, the counties
are part of a large metropolitan area (a single Census Metropolitan Statistical Area) that
shares demographic, economic, social, and cultural commonalities. Moreover, the crime
problems among juveniles and young adults in these communities are comparable and are
part of a redistributive process within a regional informal and illicit economy. 117 Because
no decision maker sorts cases into the two systems, many of the sample selection
problems inherent in a singe-jurisdiction study are removed. The longitudinal design
compares sanctions with court jurisdiction as the independent variable for both crossstate comparisons. We use sanction severity and court jurisdiction as independent
variables to study the specific deterrent effects of juvenile and criminal court sanctions.
The study years and cohort ages allow for sufficient time-at-risk to discern patterns of
recidivism and sanction effects.
B. Samples
The design is a natural experiment in that the allocation of subjects to conditions
reflects only patterns of residence that are independent from either the interventions or
the outcome measures. By matching counties within states and limiting the sampling
117

M. Sullivan, Crime and the Social Fabric, in DUAL CITY (J. Mollenkopf & M. Castells eds., 1991).
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area to adjacent Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) within a single and integrated
urban region, we control for such factors as economic opportunity, availability of
weapons and other criminogenic influences (e.g., drug use, gang influences, illegal
markets, physical environment). Comparing offender cohorts from similar if not identical
offense and offender profiles further mitigates selection biases inherent in previous
research relying on matches across disparate social areas. We also introduce analytic
strategies to further address the potential for selection effects in the sampling procedures.
1. Selecting States
The states were selected because of the large age range where natural
comparisons would be available, and because of the ready contrast in their statutory
responses to adolescent crime. In New York, cases alleging the most serious degrees of
robbery (1o and 2o), assault (1o and 2o) and burglary (1o) originate in criminal court, while
in New Jersey, comparable cases originate in juvenile court.
a. New York Statutory Analysis. The age of criminal jurisdiction for all offenders
in New York is 16, and 13, 14 or 15 for selected felony offenders under the “Juvenile
Offender Law” (hereafter, the JO Law). 118 The 1978 Act creating the category of
juvenile offender lowered the age of criminal responsibility and excluded from Family
Court jurisdiction the “designated felony” list of crimes – robbery, burglary, assault, rape,
and kidnapping – by fourteen and fifteen year old youths and murder by youths thirteen
years of age or older. 119 Because the legislative definition excludes these ages and
offenses from Family Court jurisdiction, those cases originate in adult criminal court and
include criminal procedural safeguards such as indictment, bail and public hearings, and
jury trials. Youths sentenced as Juvenile Offenders, or JO’s, can receive determinate
sentences with mandatory minimum terms in secure facilities and for periods
substantially longer than the five year maximum term for juvenile “designated felons.”
Cases with 15-year-old defendants charged with felonies originate in criminal court and
are subject to JO Law provisions for disposition.
However, provisions exist for prosecutors and criminal court judges to “remove”
or “remand” these JO cases to Family Court prior to indictment, before trial, or for

118

The Juvenile Offender Law, enacted in 1978, mandates that 14 and 15 year olds indicted for any one of 17
felony offenses, and 13 year olds indicted for homicide, are excluded from family court and processed in
criminal court.
119
1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 478, § 2. Section 30.00 of the New York Penal Law provides:
1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than sixteen years old is
not criminally responsible for conduct.
2. A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminal responsible for acts
constituting murder in the second degree . . . ; and a person fourteen or fifteen years of
age is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes . . . . [of] kidnapping in the
first degree; . . . arson in the first degree; . . . assault in the first degree; . . . manslaughter
in the first degree; . . . rape in the first degree; . . . sodomy in the first degree; . . .
aggravated sexual abuse; . . . . burglary in the first degree; . . . burglary in the second
degree; . . . arson in the second degree; . . . . robbery in the first degree; . . . robbery in the
second degree . . . ; or . . . an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or
kidnapping in the first degree.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 1998).
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sentencing following criminal conviction. 120 If a JO is not removed to Family Court, the
judge may sentence him under the “youthful offender” provision rather than impose the
determinate, mandatory minimum sentence provided. 121 Only if the court does not
“remove” a youth to Family Court and also declines to impose a “youthful offender”
sentence does a JO receive the determinate and mandatory minimum sentence authorized.
Because prosecutors, grand juries, and judges screen out large numbers of youths at
successive stages of the proceeding, only about ten percent of youths arrested for
“designated felony” offenses ultimately are tried, convicted, and sentenced as Juvenile
Offenders. 122
b. New Jersey Statutory Analysis. In New Jersey, the age of jurisdiction remains
18 years of age, though transfer to criminal court is permitted at age 13. The age of
jurisdiction for correctional confinement of juveniles is 21. The most recent revisions to
the New Jersey Juvenile Code were effective on September 1, 1983. 123 The revised code
included “tougher” delinquency sentencing and waiver provisions, and new dispositional
alternatives including fines, restitution, and community service.124 The new code also
authorized the use of short-term incarceration, not to exceed sixty days.125 The new code
created a presumption for confinement for youths charged with certain serious crimes
such as murder, rape, and robbery, and presumption for non-incarceration for those
youths convicted of less serious offenses and who have no prior record. 126 The state
legislature instructed juvenile courts to consider the characteristics of an offense and the

120

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1998). At the various stages of the proceeding, the district attorney
plays a pivotal role in deciding whether a child under the age of sixteen will be prosecuted and sentenced as a
delinquent or a Juvenile Offender with much harsher, adult consequences. Initially, the prosecutor decides
whether to file a complaint alleging an offense for which a juvenile may be held criminally responsible.
Following arraignment, the complaint may be referred to a grand jury to determine if probable cause exists to
believe that the youth committed the excluded offense and for indictment as a Juvenile Offender. However, prior
to indictment the district attorney may request removal to Family Court in the “interests of justice.” [statutory
criteria] Even if the grand jury indicts a youth as a Juvenile Offender and prior to trial, the child may be
remanded to Family Court after arraignment on the indictment on motion of the court or any party “in the
interests of justice” or with the consent of the district attorney if the indictment charges certain felonies and
certain mitigating factors are present. Youths indicted for murder, first-degree rape, sodomy or robbery, may be
receive a formal “reverse waiver” hearing to determine their appropriate for treatment as juveniles based upon
“mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed; . . . the
defendant’s participation was relatively minor . . . . ; or possible deficiencies in the proof of the crime.” 1978
N.Y. Laws, ch. 481. For youths charged with less serious, excluded offenses, such as robbery and assault, the
criminal court judge enjoys even great “transfer back” discretion based on consideration of the seriousness and
circumstances of the offense, the extent of harm caused, the history and character of the defendant, the impact of
transfer to Family Court on the welfare and safety of the community, and the utility of imposing a criminal
sentence on the youth. Id. Even if a youth is tried in criminal court as a Juvenile Offender, the case may be
removed to Family Court is he is convicted of a lesser included offense for which he cannot be found to be
criminally responsible, or if the judge deems the application of adult criminal sanctions inappropriate and the
district attorney consents to the removal and agrees to set aside the verdict. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
220.10(5)(g)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 2003).
121
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10.
122
SINGER, supra note 12; Sobie, supra note 67; S.I. Singer, J. Fagan, and A. Liberman, The Reproduction of
Juvenile Justice in Criminal Court: A Case Study of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 353.
123
N.J. Assembly Bills Nos. 641-45 (Jan. 19, 1982).
124
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-24 (b) (West 1987).
125
Id. § 2A:4-24 (c) .
126
Id. § 2A:4-25.
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criminal history of the offender when sentencing and provided for enhanced sentences for
certain serious or repeat offenders. 127
Despite retaining the structure of the juvenile court, the new code included new
provisions to shape dispositional decisions in a jurisprudence not dissimilar from the
criminal court. Although the juvenile court judge retained discretion over the
commitment decision under the new code, she must base her decision on legislatively
prescribed offense-based criteria. 128 The New Jersey code also listed “aggravating and
mitigating factors” to guide the court’s decision whether or not to incarcerate a youth. 129
The code authorized substantial sentences for the most serious crimes and proportionally
shorter sentences for less serious offenses, 130 and periods of incarceration beyond the
statutory maximum for the most serious juvenile offenders. 131
Because the new code substantially strengthened the delinquency sentencing
options, the legislature anticipated that reliance on waiver might decrease. 132 At the same
time, the code substantially revised the waiver provisions by creating a presumption for
waiver for youths charged with certain serious offenses – e.g., homicide, robbery and
arson – and putting the burden of proof on them to demonstrate their amenability to

127

Id. §§ 2A:4A-43(a), -44(a), (d). New Jersey’s code revisions reflect a desire to promote uniform terms in
sentencing and to judge delinquent acts similarly based on their characteristics. Id. § 2A:4A-20 section 25
(containing Senate Judiciary Committee Statement).
128
Section 2A:4A-43(a) of the New Jersey statutory code provides in part:
In determining the appropriate disposition for a juvenile adjudicated delinquent the court shall
weigh the following factors:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense;
(2) The degree of injury to persons or damage to property caused by the juvenile's offense;
(3) The juvenile's age, previous record, prior social service received and out-of-home
placement history.
Id. § 2A:4A-43(a).
129
Id. § 2A:4A-44(a), (b). Aggravating factors included the circumstances of the crime, the injury to or special
vulnerability of the victim, the juvenile’s prior record and its seriousness and whether the youth was paid for
committing the crime. The mitigating factors included youthfulness, lack of serious harm, provocation,
restitution for damage, the absence of prior offenses, and likely responsiveness to non-incarcerative dispositions.
Id.
130
Id. § 2A:4A-44(d)(1). The New Jersey juvenile code includes a table for sentences:
(a) Murder [first or second degree] . . . . . . . . 20 years
(b) Murder [other] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 years
(c) Crime of the first degree, except murder . . 4 years
(d) Crime of the second degree . . . . . . . . . . . 3 years
(e) Crime of the third degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 years
(f) Crime of the fourth degree . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 year
(g) Disorderly persons offense . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 months
131
Id. § 2A:4A-44(3). That is, periods of incarceration may be extended if a juvenile is convicted of first, second,
or third degree crime, has two prior convictions of crimes of the first or second degree, and has been committed
previously to a correctional facility. Youths with prior convictions who are convicted of murder may have their
20-year term extended by five years. Youths with prior records who are convicted of other crimes of the first,
second, or third degree may have their maximum sentence extended by an additional two years. Id. The release
of juveniles on parole prior to the completion of at least one-third of their sentence requires the approval of the
sentencing court. Id. § 2A:4A-44(d)(2).
132
The Committee stated in its report that “[p]ractically, this presumption [for juvenile imprisonment for serious
offenses], may encourage less dependency on waiver of a juvenile to adult court, because of some assurance that
the juvenile committing a serious crime would possibly receive a more appropriate disposition in the juvenile
system.” Id. § 2A:4A-20 (containing Senate Judiciary Committee Statement).
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treatment within the juvenile system by the age of nineteen, rather than the previous
dispositional maximum of age 21. 133
Despite the “toughening” of the juvenile code, New Jersey juvenile courts have
remained more faithful to the model and theory of the traditional juvenile courts than
nearly every other state. An evaluation of the impact of those changes on juvenile
dispositions reported relatively low overall use of incarceration sentences and very low
rates of waiver. 134 The Commission found that juvenile court judges only imposed
incarceration sentences in approximately six percent of delinquency dispositions. The
Commission reported “the new Code does, in fact, provide longer terms for a limited
class of offenses (e.g. first degree) but equal or lesser terms for the larger group of
offenses (second and third degree offenses).” 135 However, the Commission reported that
post-Code juveniles are actually serving a greater proportion of their total sentence,
suggesting that “present parole policy has toughened despite the less punitive provisions
in the Code.” 136 Finally, very few youths are transferred. 137 Fagan, in the previous
research on comparative sanctions and recidivism among adolescents in New York and
New Jersey, reported a waiver rate of below three percent for cases charged originally
with the most serious grades of robbery or burglary. 138
c. Correctional Contexts. The two states differ also in the correctional
placements accorded those who are sentenced to confinement. Juveniles convicted in
adult court in New York as JO’s initially are sent to juvenile facilities of the Office of
Children and Family Services (OCFS). At age 16, they can be transferred to adult DOCS
(Department of Correctional Services) facilities by a judge (e.g., if they are already 16
years old by the time of sentencing), or at age 18 by the OCFS facility administration.
Defendants whose crimes were committed between 16 and 19 years of age may apply for
Youthful Offender status, 139 which provides for placements in OCFS facilities until age

133

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4.
BRUCE STOUT, THE IMPACT OF THE NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (1987); W.S. Fisher & L.
Teichman, Juvenile Waivers to Adult Court: A Report to the New Jersey Legislature, 9 CRIM. JUST. Q. 68, 70--72
(1986).
135
STOUT, supra note 115, at 85-86.
136
Id. at 88.
137
Id. at 33, 85-86; Fisher & Teichman, supra note 115, at 70--72. In order to prevent any sample bias resulting
from the transfer of cases, we have included all cases in our analysis; this includes those in New York transferred
to the juvenile court and those in New Jersey transferred to the criminal court.
138
FAGAN, COMPARATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 17; Fagan, Comparative Advantages, supra note 17.
139
Section 720.10 of the New York Penal Law provides:
As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:
1. "Youth" means a person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed when he was
at least sixteen years old and less than nineteen years old or a person charged with being a
juvenile offender as defined in subdivision forty- two of section 1.20 of this chapter.
2. "Eligible youth" means a youth who is eligible to be found a youthful offender. Every youth
is so eligible unless:
(a) the conviction to be replaced by a youthful offender finding is for (i) a class A-I
or class A-II felony, or (ii) an armed felony as defined in subdivision forty-one of
section 1.20, except as provided in subdivision three, or (iii) rape in the first degree,
sodomy in the first degree, or aggravated sexual abuse, except as provided in
subdivision three, or
(b) such youth has previously been convicted and sentenced for a felony, or
(c) such youth has previously been adjudicated a youthful offender following
conviction of a felony or has been adjudicated on or after September first, nineteen
134
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21, and a discounted sentence equivalent of a sentence for a Class E felony, 140 or four
years. 141 Inmates must be transferred to adult DOCS facilities by age 21.
In contrast, all New Jersey juveniles whose cases are disposed in the juvenile
court (for crimes committed before the defendant has reached 18 years of age) are sent to
juvenile corrections facilities operated by the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission
for a term whose length is scheduled based on the final disposition charge. 142 The
incarceration term may be extended, based on petition from the prosecutor to the Court
for up to five years based on the seriousness of the crime, 143 or for up to two years if the
defendant has three or more prior juvenile court delinquency findings. 144
hundred seventy-eight a juvenile delinquent who committed a designated felony act
as defined in N.Y. Family Court Act § 301.2.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two, a youth who has been convicted of an
armed felony offense or of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, or aggravated
sexual abuse is an eligible youth if the court determines that one or more of the following
factors exist: (i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the
crime was committed; or (ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the
defendant's participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense
to the prosecution. Where the court determines that the eligible youth is a youthful offender,
the court shall make a statement on the record of the reasons for its determination, a transcript
of which shall be forwarded to the state division of criminal justice services, to be kept in
accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of section eight hundred thirty-seven-a of
the
executive
law.
4. "Youthful offender finding" means a finding, substituted for the conviction of an eligible
youth, pursuant to a determination that the eligible youth is a youthful offender.
5. "Youthful offender sentence" means the sentence imposed upon a youthful offender
finding.
6. "Youthful offender adjudication". A youthful offender adjudication is comprised of a
youthful offender finding and the youthful offender sentence imposed thereon and is
completed by imposition and entry of the youthful offender sentence.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 1998).
140
Section 60.02 of the New York Penal Law provides:
When a person is to be sentenced upon a youthful offender finding, the court must impose a
sentence
as
follows:
(1) If the sentence is to be imposed upon a youthful offender finding which has been
substituted for a conviction of an offense other than a felony, the court must impose a
sentence authorized for the offense for which the youthful offender finding was substituted,
except that if the youthful offender finding was entered pursuant to paragraph (b) of
subdivision one of section 720.20 of the criminal procedure law, the court must not impose a
definite or intermittent sentence of imprisonment with a term of more than six months; or
(2) If the sentence is to be imposed upon a youthful offender finding which has been
substituted for a conviction for any felony, the court must impose a sentence authorized to be
imposed upon a person convicted of a class E felony provided, however, that the court must
not impose a sentence of conditional discharge or unconditional discharge if the youthful
offender finding was substituted for a conviction of a felony defined in article two hundred
twenty of this chapter.
Id. § 60.02.
141
“For a class E felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed four years.” Id. § 70.00(2)(e).
For offenses classified as “violent felonies,” a minimum sentence of one and one-half years is mandated. Id. §
70.02(3)(d).
142

N.J.S.A. §2A:4A-44 (d)(1), supra n. 101.
N.J.S.A. §2A:4A-44(d)(3): “Upon application by the prosecutor, the court may sentence a juvenile who
has been convicted of a crime of the first, second, or third degree if committed by an adult, to an extended
term of incarceration beyond the maximum set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, if it finds that the
juvenile was adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an
adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree, and was previously committed to an adult or

143
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2. Selecting Counties
In New Jersey, we sampled cases from Essex, Hudson and Passaic Counties. In
New York, we sample from Brooklyn (Kings), Bronx and Queens Counties 145. The study
counties were selected because of their location within the New York metropolitan
SMSA. The matching criteria included demographic, socio-economic, labor force, and
housing characteristics, as well as the crime problem of each county. The region
provides a relatively homogeneous socio-economic area in which to compare court
responses. The counties of the region are interrelated economically, in transportation,
media and culture, and in major social institutions such as educational institutions and
medical centers. Additionally, according to 1990 census data, these counties are well
matched regarding rates of unemployment, poverty, female-headed households, and
residential mobility. The counties’ crime problems are comparable, as well, relative to
their positions in their respective states.146 Throughout the 1980s and into this decade,
each county was the among the top five counties in each state regarding their
contributions to the states’ prison population and the states’ homicide fatalities. At the
time of case selection for this study, each state was experiencing over-crowding in its
adult correctional facilities. Each county has a local incarceration facility for adults (New
York City counties share the Rikers Island facility), and local juvenile and adult detention
facilities (New York City boroughs share beds in the city’s juvenile detention system).
Each has a well-developed indigent defender system for juveniles and adults.
3. Selecting Charge Categories
The offense categories are robbery (1o and 2o), burglary (1o) and assault (1o and
2 ). These three types of crimes are recurrent criminological events which are paradigm
cases representing two faces of the debate in defining juvenile jurisdiction. Robbery and
assault events comprise the prototypical violent juvenile crimes which have evoked fear
of crime as well as legislative action in the past decade. 147 Adolescent burglary offenses
encompass a broader, more complex and persistent pattern of crimes that are recurring
challenges to judicial responses to juvenile crime. Property offenders comprise a large
proportion of incarcerated juveniles in each state and also those waived to criminal
court. 148 Appendix A analyzes the elements of the crimes enumerated in these statutes
and demonstrates their internal consistency across the states.
o

juvenile facility. The extended term shall not exceed five additional years for an act which would constitute
murder and shall not exceed two additional years for all other crimes of the first degree or second degree, if
committed by an adult, and one additional year for a crime of the third degree, if committed by an adult.”
144
N.J.S.A. §2A:4A-44.d.(4): Upon application by the prosecutor, when a juvenile is before the court at one
time for disposition of three or more unrelated offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute
crimes of the first, second or third degree and which are not part of the same transaction, the court may
sentence the juvenile to an extended term of incarceration not to exceed the maximum of the permissible
term for the most serious offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated plus two additional years.
145

We have added two counties to Fagan’s initial research, see Fagan, Men from the Boys, supra note 17, and
Fagan, Comparative Advantages, supra note 17: Hudson County, New Jersey, and Bronx County, New York.
146
FAGAN, COMPARATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 17; Fagan, Comparative Advantages, supra note 17.
147
Feld, Public Policy, supra note 2; A. Miller & L. Ohlin, The Politics of Secure Care, in VIOLENT JUVENILE
OFFENDERS (R. Mathias et al. eds., 1984).
148
YOUTH IN ADULT COURT, supra note 2; Feld, American Juvenile Court, supra note 27.
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4. Selecting Cases
A multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure yielded a sample of N= 2382
adolescents aged 15-16 and charged with the specified penal code violations. Cases
were selected after charges were filed in court: at Supreme Court indictment (the felony
court in New York), and upon filing of juvenile court petitions in New Jersey. In each
court, this selection procedure insured that only cases which have passed a probable
cause determination (i.e., a legal sufficiency determination) in each court are included in
the sample. Juvenile Offender cases in New York are originally heard in the Criminal
Court (the lower court) in New York. They are arraigned there and, if indicted, they are
arraigned again in the Supreme Court, the felony jurisdiction for New York, and
adjudicated there. In New Jersey, court intake officers screen petitions at the time they
are filed, and simultaneously with prosecutorial screening for legal sufficiency. This
procedure avoided sample attrition at the outset from prosecutorial screening or
dismissals prior to arraignment.
5. Data Sources
The New Jersey Administrative Office of Courts provided New Jersey data for
Hudson County in automated format. For the other two New Jersey counties, data were
manually collected at the county courthouses from case files of sampled individuals.
Adult records provided by the New Jersey State Police supplemented these data. New
York data were provided by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the city’s
pretrial services agency, which collects and stores data on all New York City criminal
defendants. The New York data were supplemented by data from the New York
Department of Criminal Justice Services, including data concerning cases waived from
the criminal court down to New York family court and case information on defendants’
prior juvenile court case histories. The data were sampled in a two-stage process: first a
population of eligible cases, based on the above sampling criteria, was established for
each county. Then cases were sampled based on their representation by age, sex and
offense within each county.
6. Time-at-risk
Each sampled individual was tracked through December 1999, thus allowing a
minimum seven year follow-up period for measuring time-at-risk. This provided
sufficient time for almost all sampled individuals to have completed their sentences and
accumulate at least two years time-at-risk to meaningfully analyze the effects of sanctions
on recidivism. Only 14 cases of the nearly 2,400 were censored from the analyses due to
an inadequate time-at-risk period.
To determine time-at-risk, we calculated the number of days following sentencing
on the sampled case that each individual was not in custody. For cases that did not result
in incarceration, the time-at-risk began on the day of sentencing. For cases that did result
in incarceration, time-at-risk began upon release from custodial institution. To determine
this date among New Jersey cases, we obtained actual release dates from the records of
the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission. To determine this date among New York
cases, we estimated sentence length as 2/3 of the maximum sentence. This estimate was
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used on advice of staff at the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, by whom the
sentencing data were supplied. 149
7. Sample Description

Table 1 displays demographic information for the individuals included in our
entire sample and in each of the two jurisdictions that comprise the sample, New Jersey
and New York. Though the two sub-samples are very similar to one another, there are
some important differences between the sampled individuals in New York and in New
Jersey. In New York, there is a larger proportion of 16-year-olds (as opposed to 15-yearolds), a slightly larger proportion of males, and a greater proportion of racial minorities
than in the New Jersey sub-sample.

Table 1. Sample Demographics by State
New Jersey
(n=1061)
%

New York
(n=1321)
%

Age
15
16

46.9
53.1

30.8
69.2

Female
Male

17.1
82.9

11.8
88.2

White

13.3

4.9

African-American

54.8

58.0

Hispanic

26.1

32.2

Asian

0.2

1.4

Other and Unknown

5.6

3.5

Sex

Race and Ethnicity

Table 2 provides information on the sampled cases in the entire sample and each
sub-sample. Again, though they are mostly similar, some important differences exist
between the two sub-samples. Perhaps most importantly, there is a much larger
proportion of robbery cases in New York, and correspondingly smaller numbers of
aggravated assault and burglary cases. This preponderance of robbery cases is a result of
the charge distribution of JO cases in New York City, which has been confirmed by other
research efforts. 150 Other, less important differences between cases sampled in each state
149

See M. PHILLIPS ET AL., ESTIMATING DISPLACEMENT FOR ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION PROGRAMS IN
NEW YORK CITY (2002).
150
E.g., A. Liberman & L. Winterfield, Case Processing of Juvenile Arrests in New York City’s Adult and
Juvenile Courts During Fiscal Year 1992 (1996); A. Liberman et al., Specialized Court Parts for Juvenile
Offenders in New York City’s Adult Felony Courts: Case Processing in 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 (2000). See
also Akiva Liberman & William Raleigh, Specialized Court Parts for Juvenile Offenders in New York City’s

2007]

FAGAN, KUPCHIK AND LIBERMAN

27

exist as well. The New York cases are more likely to have been detained by the courts
prior to adjudication and more likely to have an associated weapon charge. However,
arrest warrants were ordered more often during case processing of New Jersey cases; in
addition, the New Jersey individuals were more likely to have been arrested prior to this
case, to have more extensive arrest histories (among only those with any prior arrests),
and more likely to be arrested while the sampled case was being processed.

Adult Felony Courts: Case Processing in 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 (May 1, 1998) (unpublished paper presented
at 1998 Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology, on file with the author) (finding that the
criminal court was more punitive than the juvenile court over its entire caseload). Liberman and Raleigh
restricted juvenile court cases to those comparable to the criminal court cases on age and charge (i.e., fourteenand fifteen-year-olds arrested on Juvenile-Offender-eligible charges), and also examined robbery cases alone,
which comprise more than half of the criminal court caseload. A higher proportion of cases were formally
prosecuted (filed) in the criminal court than in the juvenile court system (88% versus 50% overall, or 88% versus
48% for robberies alone, respectively), and the criminal court detained more cases pretrial than the juvenile court
(48% versus 18% overall, or 41% versus 15% for robberies alone, respectively); however, these withinjurisdictional results were more ambiguous at conviction and sentencing.
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Table 2. Current Case Information by State
New Jersey

New York

(n=1061)

(n=1321)

% Robbery

24.4

80.3

% Aggravated Assault

43.4

15.2

% Burglary

31.1

4.5

% Ever Detained by Court

41.4

47.0

% Warrant Ordered by Court

18.6

7.9

% With Associated Weapon Charge

34.9

41.4

% With Prior Arrest Record

67.0

45.0

Mean Number of Prior Arrests

5.6

2.4

Mean Number of Prior Convictions

3.1

1.1

% Previously Incarcerated

4.1

14.4

% Rearrested During Case Processing

37.1

16.3

Mean Number of Rearrests During Case
Processing

1.9

1.3

140.7

132.6

Charge

Mean Case Length (days – for cases without
bench warrants)

These differences among sub-samples stem from our strategy, discussed above, of
sampling according to the characteristics of the populations of eligible cases in each state
jurisdiction. Thus, sample differences result from variation between the two populations
sampled. All demographic and case variables are included in the following analyses as
control variables, in order to hold these values constant as we compare jurisdictional
differences. With regard to the disparity among top arrest charges, it should be noted that
because we selected very specific charge codes in each state, the included charges are all
of approximately equal severity within each state.
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C. Independent Variables
The range of independent variables in our dataset was limited by data availability
and similarity of available data across all data sources. We only include in our analyses
variables that are similarly measured across states, yet this resulted in a collection of
independent variables that matches or exceeds the lists of variables found in much of the
existing research on recidivism. Means and standard deviations for these variables are
shown in Appendix B1. We include the following variables:
Demographics
•
age – measured as a continuous variable, from 15.0 to 16.9
•
sex – included as a dummy variable denoting female
•
ethnicity – white, Hispanic American, African American, or other
ethnicity
Current Case
•
Top arrest charge at indictment or at time of either indictment in criminal
court or filing of delinquency petition in juvenile court– either robbery,
burglary or aggravated assault
•
Weapon -- whether a weapon charge was associated with this arrest –
binary 151
•
Bench Warrant Issued during Case Processing – binary
•
Detention during Case Processing – binary
•
Concurrent Arrests – the number of concurrent arrests during case
processing (this variable is labeled concurrent arrests) – logged.
•
Case Length – time from arrest to final disposition – logged
•
Adjudication – a variable measuring a finding of guilt (or a sustained
delinquency petition), including both formal conviction or adjudication as
well as informal diversion corresponding to a supervision sanction –
binary 152
•
The number of months incarcerated, if the defendant was given a custodial
sentence – we use the natural logarithm of the number of months
Criminal History
•
The number of prior arrests – logged
•
Whether the defendant had been previously incarcerated – binary
•
Age at first arrest
151

We use this as the most reliable and consistent measure of weapon use available in the study. Investigation
reports are inconsistent with respect to mentions of the presence of a weapon. However, practice is more
consistent with respect to including a weapons charge in the indictment or juvenile court petition, particularly for
firearms. The inclusion of this indicator also creates a distinction between robberies, assaults and burglaries
committed with weapons and those committed without them.
152
Because of differences in how such diversion is handled in the two systems, this “court action outcome” is a
more comparable outcome across systems than formal conviction is an official definition of “conviction.” We
discuss this distinction further below.
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Adult vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
•
State – New York or New Jersey
•
We include three interaction terms
a) the interaction between state and the (logged) number of prior
arrests
b) the interaction between state and length (in months, logged) of
custodial sentences
c) the interaction between state and the dummy variable indicating
any court action (analogous to conviction)

Censored Cases
•
Censor – the predicted value from a logistic regression equation to predict
censoring of cases that were unavailable for analysis due to inadequate
time-at-risk (n=14 cases).
Selection
•
Selection – the predicted value from a logistic regression equation to
estimate sample differences between the states.

D. Dependent Variables

Case outcomes included certainty, severity, and celerity of sanctions across the two
jurisdictions. These measures were compared across states to estimate differences in the
sanctioning rates between criminal court and juvenile court. 153 Then, we use official
arrest records to construct several measures based on officially recorded contacts with the
law: failure times and rates, frequency of arrest and conviction, severity of arrest charge,
offending rates (per unit of time at risk), and subsequent incarceration. We also
computed offense-specific recidivism measures that collapse numerous penal code
offense categories into five homogeneous dimensions of criminality:
•
•
•
•
•

Violence: homicide, manslaughter, felony assault, robbery, rape,
kidnap, and arson.
Property: grand larceny, auto theft, and burglary.
Weapons: unlawful possession of firearms, cutting instruments, or
other weapons
Misdemeanors: all other penal code violations except drug offenses.
Drugs: Sale or possession of controlled substances, sale or possession
of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia.

Appendix B2 shows the correlation matrix of the prevalence measures of recidivism
and the offense, offender and sanction variables that are used in the model estimation
routines.
153

See, Kupchik et al., Punishment, Proportionality and Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test
of the Leniency Gap Hypotheses, supra note 63.
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E. Data Analysis

The analytic goal of this study is to determine the relationship between court
jurisdiction, sanction severity and recidivism, controlling for offense and offender
characteristics. We first examine first whether there is a “leniency gap” between juvenile
and criminal courts, and then examine the effects of court jurisdiction on recidivism,
while accounting for differential sanctions.
1. Analysis of Case Processing and Sanctions

We first analyze differences between court jurisdictions in the certainty, severity,
and celerity of sanctions. To measure certainty and severity, we compare the likelihood
of conviction across states and the sentences received by defendants in each state. To
measure celerity of punishment, we compare case processing times among cases in each
court system.
2. Recidivism: Descriptive Results

To begin measuring the effects of court jurisdiction and sanction severity on
recidivism, we first present descriptive results of recidivism by state. We then stratify by
each of several variables which seem to have general associations with recidivism, and
which differ somewhat between the NY and NJ samples. By stratifying, one can see
whether the overall pattern of results persists, or whether the overall pattern has been
influenced by other differences between the two samples. We present recidivism results
stratified by arrest charge on the sampled case, history of prior arrest, and sex. Because
disposition and sentencing differs between NY and NJ, we also stratify by the disposition
and sentence imposed on the sampled case. Of course, these descriptive results are only
suggestive because they control for only one possible confounding variable at a time, and
also fail to control for many others.
3. Analyses of Recidivism: Multivariate Analyses

We then turn to more definitive multivariate analyses of recidivism. These
analyze the effect of court jurisdiction on recidivism, while simultaneously controlling
for the sampled charge, disposition and sanction on the sampled case, as well as
controlling for demographic variables (age, sex, ethnicity), other case variables (e.g.,
detention, concurrent cases), and criminal history variables (prior arrests, prior
incarceration, and age of first arrest).
We use two different types of multivariate procedures. First, we use hazard
models to examine the likelihood of, and time to, recidivism. Because in hazard models
each defendant can only fail (i.e., recidivate) once, we estimate different hazard models
to explore alternative types of recidivism. Model 1 uses the first rearrest as the measure
of recidivism, Models 2 through 13 estimates the timing of first rearrests for specific
types of offenses, and Model 14 estimates subsequent incarceration as the measure of
recidivism. The essence of these models is to compare whether NY defendants (most
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under adult court jurisdiction) are more or less likely to be rearrested than NJ defendants
(most under juvenile court jurisdiction), taking into account time until recidivism.
We use Cox proportional hazard models 154 to assess both the probability and the
timing of rearrest. The proportional hazards model allows us to specify the hazards (or
probability) and timing of rearrest as a function of court jurisdiction and sanction
severity, while controlling for additional offender, offense, and case processing factors.
The Cox multivariate procedure permits testing of specific hypotheses by including
covariates in the model and testing for their significance against a model with no
predictors. 155 The Cox model maximizes a partial likelihood based only on ranked noncensored cases. 156 In the multivariate case of Cox regression, partial likelihood provides
the proportional hazards model with unbiased and efficient estimates of the relative risk
of rearrest associated with changes in the independent variables. 157 Cox regression is
well suited to the more difficult case of continuous data, mainly because estimates of the
hazard function are derived through integration, and because it adapts to progressive as
well as simple censoring. 158
We also use a competing risks hazard model to establish a hierarchy of severity of
rearrest offenses. In this variant of proportional hazard models, the occurrence of one
type of event removes the individual from the risk of other event types. 159 That is, the
person is censored from the analysis of a second type of event at the point in time when
154

D. R. Cox, Regression Models and Life Tables, 34 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC. 187 (1972). See also P.D. ALLISON,
EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984) [hereinafter ALLISON, EVENT
HISTORY ANALYSIS]; P. D. ALLISON, SURVIVAL ANALYSIS USING THE SAS SYSTEM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1995)
[hereinafter ALLISON, SURVIVAL ANALYSIS]; W. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC METHODS (1990); B. Efron, The
Efficiency of Cox’s Likelihood Functions for Censored Data, 72 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 557 (1977); C.A. Visher &
R.L. Linster, Survival Models of Pretrial Failure, 6 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1990).
155
In the special case of the proportional hazards model, the time function is neither specified nor estimated
thanks to the partial likelihood estimation procedure. The model assumes that the risks for all cases are simple
multiples of the baseline function, and the coefficients thus represent the change in the relative risks of failure (in
our case rearrest) associated with a unit change in the independent variable in question. The partial likelihood
test used in Cox regression constructs a likelihood function depending upon the unknown parameters and the
observed data, Cox, supra note 125, and then finds parameter values that maximize this function based only on
those cases that are uncensored. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 125.
156
Cox, supra note 125.
157
See GREENE, supra note 125; J. Lee et al., Covariance Adjustment of Survival Curves Based on Cox's
Proportional Hazards Regression Model, 8 COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN THE BIOSCIENCES 23-27 (1992); see
also Efron, supra note 125, as cited in ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 125. The hazard index is
estimated as:
loge (hi(t)/ho(t)) = B1x1 + ... + Bp(xp)
where ho(t) is the baseline hazard function (when all independent variables take on their mean values), and hi(t) is
the hazard function of cases with that particular combination of values for the covariates.
158
For example, in a study of the recidivism of prison releasees, data are simply (or singly) censored if, for a two
year follow-up period, it is known only that 50% of the cases were rearrested/ convicted/ returned to prison etc..
Data are progressively censored if some cases leave the jurisdiction before the end of the follow-up period, if
some cases die, etc. Because of these cases, the actual sample size changes as a function of time, and the exact
proportions failing and surviving during each interval cannot be known. As a result, the hazard function cannot
be calculated, but must instead be estimated. While Cox models are not as well suited for discrete data as are
transition rate models such Markov renewal, semi-Markov, see ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, supra note
125, logit or probit models, Markov-type models are not easily adapted to progressive censoring.
159
ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, supra note __.
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the first event occurs. Each event type is analyzed separately and has its own hazard
function. 160 The overall hazard function, h(t) is simply the sum of all the type-specific
hazard functions. 161 This procedure also allows for estimating different types of models
for different types of risk, or to separate models where the occurrence of each type of
event may have a different causal structure. We also use Cox models to estimate the
probability of return to incarceration.
To examine offending rates, or the frequency of rearrest per unit of time not
incarcerated, we use negative binomial regression models. 162 Negative binomial models
are well-suited to analyses predicting counts of events, such as rearrests or
reconvictions. 163 The models generate maximum likelihood estimates of the relationship
of the discrete dependent variable to a set of explanatory or predictive variables,
including both chi-square tests and log likelihood statistics to assess model fit. These
models (Models 15 to 19) are estimated separately by type of rearrest offenses.

4. Charge Effects
To insure that the analyses are not biased by differences in the composition of
offenders in the sample charge categories between NY and NJ, we estimated two
additional model specifications for all models for which the initial competing hazard
results showed a significant effect of state. First, we estimated models that include
interaction terms of the dummy variable indicating robbery charge and each other
independent variable (robbery x age, robbery x sex, etc.). This controls for any
differential effect of being charged with robbery and still allows us to estimate the effect
of jurisdiction on recidivism. Second, we estimated robbery-specific models, in which
we excluded aggravated assault and burglary cases from both states, to include only cases
of the same arrest charge.
5. Estimating the Effects of Sample Differences across States
160

The type-specific hazard rate is defined as:
hj(t) = lim Pj(t,t + s) /s
s>0

where there are m different types of events and j=1,...,m.
Let P, (t, t + s) be the probability that event type j occurs in the interval between t and t+s, given that the
individual is at risk at time t. In this model, continuous time methods are most appropriate since the exact date of
the rearrest is known.
161
ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS, supra note __, at 46.
162
We compared these results with analyses using an overdispersed Poisson regression. Even with the
correction, there was too much overdispersion to justify using the Poisson results. Our experience is consistent
with what has been reported in other studies using count models of recidivism or criminal events. See, e.g., C.
Kenneth et al., A Comparison of Poisson, Negative Binomial, and Semiparametic Mixed Regression Models with
Empirical Applications to Criminal Careers Data, 24 SOC. METHODS & RES. 387 (1996). Moreover, there is
criticism of the implicit assumption in Poisson models that the variance equals the mean, an assumption we are
unwilling to make. See, e.g., P. MCCULLAGH & J. NELDER, GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS (2d ed. 1989).
163
GREENE, supra note 125; P. SCHMIDT & A. WITTE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (1984).
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We applied several sampling strategies to ensure homogeneity in offense and
offender characteristics in each state (treatment condition). Nevertheless, the possibility
remains that sanction effects are under-identified due to state differences, and that
selection may influence these results. We addressed the threat of selection that is
inherent in case control designs such as this in several ways. First, we matched offenses
across penal laws in the two states to ensure narrative consistency in the meanings of the
charge categories, including factors such as injury and weapon use that are components
of each statute. Second, we estimated a selection parameter, or propensity score, to
identify systemic differences in the tow samples using both legal (charge, prior record,
drug or weapon use) and social (demographic) characteristics of cases and offenders. 164
Propensity scores were estimated using a logistic regression with court jurisdiction as the
binary outcome. Following Bang and Robins 165 and Indurkhya, Mitra and Schrag, 166 we
use the inverse logit of the predicted probability or propensity score to control for
selection effects between the two states.
We then estimated recidivism and re-incarceration models both with and without
the effects of selection and compared the results. There was no change in the
significance of either state (court) or sanctions (incarceration) when the propensity score
was included in the models. Third, we included as predictors in the recidivism and reincarceration models those characteristics that reflect judicial and prosecutorial
assessments of risk: associated weapons charges, detention, and concurrent cases, and
criminal history variables. These risk assessments may influence both judicial decisions
regarding sanctions and also may predict re-offending. We estimated models that control
for these characteristics. Accordingly, the results incorporate methods to account and
adjust for selection, and therefore are close approximations to experimental results. 167
We also took additional measures to insure that the differing charge compositions
between the NY and NJ samples did not bias our results. In particular, many more of the
NY cases were charged with robbery. 168 We estimated two additional model
specifications for all hazard models which initially showed a significant effect of state.
First, we estimated models that include interaction terms of the dummy variable
indicating robbery charge and each other independent variable (robbery x age, robbery x
sex, etc.). This controls for any differential effect of being charged with robbery and still
allows us to estimate the effect of jurisdiction on recidivism. Second, we estimated

164

See, e.g., Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects from Large Data Sets Using Propensity Scores, 127
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 757 (1997). Following Berk (Berk, Li and Hickman 2005) and Rosenbaum and Rubin
1983), we use propensity scores to adjust for this problem. In short, propensity scores are the estimated
probability of membership in each of the treatment groups that account for confounding variables between the
outcome of interest (prior record) and the selection into juvenile or adult court. See, R. Berk, A. Li, and L.
Hickman, Statistical Difficulties in Determining the Role of Race in Capital Cases: A Re-analysis of Data from
the State of Maryland. 21 J. QUANT. CRIM.365 (2005); P.R. Rosenbaum and D.R. Rubin, The Central Role of
Propensity Scores in Observational Studies of Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983).
165
Heejung Bang and James M. Robins, Doubly Robust Estimation in Missing Data and Causal Inference
Models. 61 BIOMETRICS 962 (2005).
166
A. Indurkhya, N. Mitra, and Deborah Schrag, Using Propensity Scores to Estimate the Cost-Effectiveness of
Medical Therapies, 25 STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 1561 (2006).
167
See, Rubin, supra note __.
168

See, infra Table __.
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robbery-specific models, in which we excluded aggravated assault and burglary cases
from both states, to include only cases of the same arrest charge.
Finally, we used initial rather than final jurisdiction in the analyses presented
below. That is, all New York cases are treated as in the adult criminal court, and all New
Jersey cases in the juvenile court. In actuality, some New Jersey cases were waived to
criminal court, while some New York cases were transferred to the Family Court (see
Table 2, below). Analyses by their original jurisdiction, therefore, should lead to overly
conservative estimates of the effect of jurisdiction. 169 However, we also reanalyzed the
data using final court jurisdiction (of sentencing), rather than original court jurisdiction,
as our key predictor. In addition, because where the age of majority in New York is 16,
so that the cases of 16-year-old arrested cannot be transferred to the Family Court, we
also reestimated these models with the sample limited to arrestees who were 16 at the
time of offense., Results were substantively the same with both of these reanalyses.

169

This is analogous to analyzing intent-to-treat rather than treatment-as-delivered in program evaluation,
in the case of program dropouts and crossovers.
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IV. RESULTS
A. Analysis of Case Processing and Sanctions
1. Certainty and Severity of Sanctions
Table 3 shows the adjudication and sentence rates in each state. As displayed in
the top row, conviction was more likely in New Jersey than in New York (61.3% vs.
52.0%). This trend is consistent for all included offense types: robbery, assault and
burglary. However, each state has a middle-ground disposition, called “adjourned
disposition” in New Jersey and “adjourned in contemplation of dismissal” in New York.
An admission of guilt is required to receive this disposition in New Jersey, but not so in
New York. Thus they have different meanings regarding their official legal status, yet
they are very similar in practice; with both dispositions, cases are reconsidered after a
specified period of time and dropped from consideration of further sanction if no new
infractions have occurred. Thus, some of the convictions in NY are comparable to nonconvicted “adjourned in contemplation of dismissals” in NJ. If we add these “adjourned”
dispositions to the official convictions, then we find that that NY actually “convicts” at a
similar rate (61.3% in NJ vs. 59.2% in NY). In multivariate analyses of recidivism in
which disposition and sentencing are controlled for statistically, we do not use the official
“conviction” disposition. Instead, we use an “any court action” variable which is
equivalent across the two systems, and which treats both formal conviction/adjudication
as well as this diversion as a court action. 170
An interesting comparison regarding case outcomes is the percentages of cases in
each state that were transferred to juvenile or criminal court. In New Jersey, cases can be
transferred from juvenile to criminal court, in New York cases can be transferred from
criminal court down to juvenile court. As Table 3 demonstrates, jurisdictional transfer up
to criminal court is less common in New Jersey (1.2% of all cases) than transfer down to
juvenile (family) court is in New York (11.1% of total sample; 35.9% of 15-year-olds).
Table 3 also displays the most severe sentences given to convicted defendants in each
state. Informal sanctions, including community service and mandated treatment
programs, are given more often in New Jersey than in New York (26.0% vs. 19.4%).
Monetary fines as the most severe sanction are shown separately. Though fines often are
levied in conjunction with other sentences, it is very rare in both states for them to be the
most severe sentence (0.2% in New Jersey, 1.2% in New York).

170

See discussion infra Part II.C.
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Table 3. Adjudication and Sentences by Arrest Charge and State
New Jersey

New York

Aggravated
Burglary
Assault
58.7
57.3
69.0

Robbery
% Convicted
% Adjourned in contemplation of
dismissal, and not convicted
% Transferred to other Jurisdiction

0.0

Total
61.3

Aggravated
Burglary
Assault
53.3
44.0
55.9

Robbery

Total
52.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

6.2

11.0

11.9

7.2

3.3

0.2

0.9

1.2

12.3

5.5

6.8

11.1

% Given Informal Sanction

29.2

25.8

24.0

26.0

15.0

46.6

21.2

19.4

% Given Probation

27.8

33.1

44.4

35.8

41.5

29.5

36.4

39.7

0.0

0.0

0.4

0.2

0.7

4.5

0.0

1.2

% Given Suspended Sentence

20.3

15.6

21.3

18.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

% Incarcerated

13.3

13.7

5.3

10.7

42.6

19.3

42.4

32.6

9.5

11.8

4.4

8.7

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.1

31.0

8.0

19.5

18.5

27.5

15.0

26.2

26.6

Sanction if convicted

% Given Fine / Restitution

% Missing

Mean Incarceration Length (mos.)
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More convicted New York cases (39.7%) than New Jersey cases (35.8%) are
sentenced to probation, but this figure is misleading due to similarity of probation and
suspended sentences in New Jersey, a sentencing category that is unused in New York.
Suspended sentences are probationary sentences with an added threat that a rearrest will
lead to incarceration. We include them here because they are a separate and important
sentencing category in New Jersey, although similar in practice to sentences of probation.
If the categories of probation and suspended sentence are combined, then far more cases
receive probation in New Jersey than New York (54.5% vs. 39.7%).
The easiest comparison to make between the two states is of the use of
incarceration. Though conditions of incarceration may be very different, incarceration is
a less ambiguous category than conviction or any other sentencing category. The
difference in the use of incarceration in New York and New Jersey is very clear – 10.7%
of convicted New Jersey cases are incarcerated as opposed to 39.6% of New York cases.
This trend is consistent across the three arrest charges in our sample. Furthermore,
among those sentenced to incarceration, New York cases receive average sentences of
26.6 months compared to only 18.5 months in New Jersey.
In response to our research question of whether a punishment gap exists, these
results clearly indicate that criminal courts do indeed provide more severe punishment
than juvenile courts. Although the New Jersey cases face a greater likelihood of
conviction (as defined officially), once convicted they face more lenient sanctions. This
is confirmed by the vastly greater use of incarceration in New York than in New Jersey,
and by the greater sentence lengths for cases that are incarcerated. If we ask what
percentage of the arrest sample (rather than the convicted subsample) are convicted, we
find that the rate is much higher in NY (17% vs. 7%).
2. Celerity of Sanctions
Table 4 shows the length of time between incident and final disposition for each
case, for cases in which bench warrants were not issued. The disposition date is
considered to be the date of adjudication for cases not convicted, or date of sentencing for
cases that were convicted. Overall, time to disposition is slightly greater in New Jersey
(141 days) than in New York (133 days). However, when considering convicted and notconvicted cases separately, some differences appear. New York courts take an average of
61 days longer to reach sentencing on convicted cases than do New Jersey courts. But,
New York courts are far quicker to dispose of cases that do not result in conviction – 92
days on average compared to 154 days on average in New Jersey. In fact, New York
courts dispose of non-convicted cases in approximately half the time, on average, than
convicted cases. Yet New Jersey takes an average of thirty days longer to dispose of
non-convicted cases than convicted cases.
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Table 4. Case Processing Time by State and Conviction Status
(Mean number of days)

Convicted cases

Non-convicted cases

All cases

New Jersey

New York

123.2

184.1

(n=366)

(n=538)

153.8

91.8

(n=489)

(n=678)

140.7

132.6

(n=855)

(n=1216)

B. Recidivism – Descriptive Results
We turn now to our primary research question concerning the effects of
prosecution in criminal versus juvenile court on recidivism. We begin with descriptive
results, shown in Table 5. We find that rearrest effects seem to vary by type of rearrest.
Overall, rearrest in slightly more common in New Jersey than New York (72.4% vs.
69.0%) 171 and is also somewhat earlier in New Jersey on average (365 vs. 538 days).
However, this effect depends on the type of rearrest. There is a greater likelihood of
rearrest for violent offenses in NY than in New Jersey (41.8% vs. 29.9%), but no
apparent difference in the timing of violent rearrest. Rearrest for property offenses is also
somewhat more likely in NY (33.5% vs. 30.9%), albeit somewhat slower. In contrast,
drug rearrests are more common in New Jersey than NY (44.2% vs. 34.7%). The
percentage incarcerated following any rearrest are virtually equivalent in both states 172.

171

In comparing rearrest we excluded from consideration arrests for technical probation or parole violations. We
did so to avoid introducing measurement bias, due to different reporting procedures in the two states. In New
York, technical violations are not recorded as new arrests, but rather as continuations of the previous cases.
Conversely in New Jersey technical violations are recorded as new cases. Violations stemming from
commission of an actual offense (other than a technical violation, such as not reporting to probation) were
included in all analyses.
172
As referred to above, these figures include all cases transferred to criminal court in New Jersey (n=13) and
down to juvenile court in New York (n=146). All individuals transferred to criminal court in New Jersey were
rearrested, and 63% of the New York cases transferred down to juvenile court were rearrested. Thus including
these cases leads to a conservative estimate of the difference between the two states, and helps avoid a selection
bias that might result from excluding them.
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Table 5. Recidivism by State (Percent rearrested, and time to first
rearrest in parentheses)
Any Rearrest

Violent Rearrest

Property Rearrest

Drug Rearrest

Weapons Rearrest

Subsequent Incarceration

New Jersey

New York

Odds Ratio

72.4

69.0

0.85

(378.4)

(507.5)

29.9

41.8

(641.1)

(641.8)

30.9

33.5

(528.5)

(645.8)

44.2

34.7

(600.2)

(863.8)

9.7

10.1

(716.8)

(752.2)

34.7

35.4

1.68

1.13

0.67

1.05

1.03

Next, we stratify our samples on each of several variables. Although these are
merely descriptive results, they illustrate the effect of controlling these variables in our
multivariate analyses. Table 6 show the results when stratified by the sampled arrest
charge, which is important in light of the different charge distributions in the two states.
Generally, if we look at the rearrest rates, the overall pattern of results persist so that we
find greater likelihood of rearrest in New York on violent or property offenses, but
greater likelihood of rearrest in New Jersey for drug offenses, although the magnitudes of
these recidivism differences fluctuate somewhat by arrest charge (e.g., the greater violent
rearrest in New York is considerable for robbery cases, but much smaller or assault
cases). One exception is that more burglary offenders are rearrested for property offenses
in NY than in New Jersey. We also see some state differences in rates of subsequent
incarceration, but these vary with the sampled arrest charge; the likelihood of subsequent
incarceration is greater in New Jersey for those initially sampled on assault or robbery
cases, but greater in New York for burglary cases.
Table 6 shows that the state effect on rearrest rates sometimes is in one direction,
while the effect on time to rearrest may be in the opposite direction. For example, we
again see that burglary offenders are more likely to be rearrested on property offenses in
New Jersey than in New York. At the same time, they are slower to be rearrested in New
Jersey.
Table 7 shows recidivism stratified by prior arrest records. Controlling for prior
arrest is important because those with prior arrest records generally are more likely to be
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rearrested, and yet more of the New Jersey sample had prior arrest records. 173 Figures 2a
and 2b show these results graphically. Even casual examination reveals that recidivism
rates in the two states are higher for those with prior arrest records. Looking at those
individuals with prior arrest records, results are very similar to the overall results reported
above.
However, for those without prior arrest records, we see that the New York cases
show even higher recidivism rates relative to New Jersey cases, for violent and property
rearrest. At the same time, the difference in drug rearrest previously seen disappears. In
combination, these lead to an overall higher rearrest rate in New York for those without
prior arrests. These results highlight the importance of analytic procedures that
simultaneously examine both the likelihood of rearrest and time to rearrest, while also
controlling for time-at-risk.
Table 8 stratifies by the disposition and sentence received on the sampled case.
Taking account of the disposition and sentence alters some of the apparent recidivism
effects. Cases sentenced to probation or not convicted show the same general patterns of
recidivism already seen, with more New York youth rearrested on violent or property
charges, but more New Jersey youth rearrested on drug charges. However, among cases
sentenced to other (community) sentences or sentenced to incarceration, the violent and
property rearrest effects are diminished, while the drug rearrest effect persists.
Table 9 shows rates of recidivism stratified by sex. Recidivism is far higher for
males than females. Nevertheless, both males and females show the same basic patterns
already seen, of greater prevalence of rearrest for violence in New York but more
rearrests for drugs in New Jersey. The greater propensity for property offenses in New
York, however, seems limited to females.

173

See Table 1. The inclusion of prior juvenile arrest history for our NY adult court sample is an important
advance of this study, over the previous study. FAGAN, COMPARATIVE IMPACTS, supra note 17; Fagan, Men from
Boys, supra note 17; Fagan, Comparative Advantage, supra note 17. The more extensive arrest histories in NJ
suggest that police in that state are more active, which would be expected to bias our recidivism results opposite
the direction of the main results found. To insure that differential reporting of prior arrests between states could
not bias our multivariate recidivism findings, we re-estimated those models in two ways: (a) using prior
convictions rather than prior arrests, (b) excluding criminal history from the models. Our substantive findings
were unaffected.
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Table 6. Recidivism Stratified by Sample Arrest Charge
(Percent rearrested, and mean time to first rearrest in parentheses)
Robbery
Assault

Any Rearrest

Violent Rearrest

Property Rearrest

Drug Rearrest

Weapons Rearrest

Subsequent Incarceration

Burglary

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

75.2

70.8

71.6

60.7

71.2

66.1

(346.4)

(495.3)

(396.4)

(605.3)

(380.9)

(436.0)

35.2

43.0

32.5

35.8

21.8

40.7

(672.4)

(651.0)

(671.2)

(615.4)

(537.1)

(544.8)

32.2

34.8

26.0

28.4

36.7

27.1

(498.6)

(651.8)

(604.3)

(689.3)

(474.9)

(353.7)

48.1

36.6

43.4

26.9

42.1

28.8

(545.4)

(863.1)

(616.2)

(972.3)

(628.3)

(535.5)

10.4

10.0

10.6

9.0

7.9

15.3

(793.6)

(771.0)

(754.0)

(674.4)

(563.8)

(687.4)

40.7

36.6

29.7

27.4

36.7

40.7
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Figure 2a. Recidivism Measures for Cases Without Prior Arrest Records,
by State
70.0
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Property Offense
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% Incarcerated for
any Rearrest
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Figure 2b. Recidivism Measures for Cases With Prior Arrest Records,
by State
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70.0

New York

Percent

60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
% Rearrested

% Rearrested for
Violence

% Rearrested for
Property Offense

% Rearrested for
Drug Offense

% Rearrested for
Weapon Violation

% Incarcerated for
any Rearrest

2007]

FAGAN, KUPCHIK AND LIBERMAN

45

Table 7. Recidivism Stratified by Presence of Prior Arrest Record
(Percent rearrested, and mean time to first rearrest in parentheses)
No Prior Record

Any Rearrest

Violent Rearrest

Property Rearrest

Drug Rearrest

Weapons Rearrest

Subsequent Incarceration

Prior Record

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

51.1

60.4

82.8

79.6

(522.9)

(600.6)

(334.6)

(421.0)

14.0

33.1

37.7

52.4

(868.6)

(704.4)

(599.5)

(593.2)

14.6

28.6

39.0

39.4

(680.0)

(742.6)

(500.6)

(559.8)

28.6

27.9

51.9

43.1

(734.9)

(955.6)

(563.7)

(791.0)

4.6

6.9

12.2

14.0

(719.6)

(863.5)

(716.2)

(685.2)

13.1

23.8

45.3

49.5
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Table 8. Recidivism Stratified by Disposition and Sentence on Sample Case (Percent
rearrested, and mean time to first rearrest in parentheses)
Not Convicted
NJ

NY

Other Sentence
NJ

NY

Probation
NJ

NY

Incarcerated
NJ

(n=452) (n=596) (n=175) (n=142) (n=355) (n=299) (n=79)
Any Rearrest

64.4

63.9

(434.1) (605.2)
Violent Rearrest

25.4

38.6

(718.4) (733.5)
Property Rearrest

24.3

30.5

(573.0) (799.0)
Drug Rearrest

39.2

33.2

(609.5) (984.3)
Weapons Rearrest

5.8

10.4

(607.3) (917.0)

73.6
(391.2)
31.8
(656.0)
33.8
(538.9)
45.3
(696.1)
11.5
(988.9)

59.2

80.8

(658.4) (346.7)
33.1

32.1

(731.6) (601.3)
31.7

36.3

(781.2) (538.0)
30.3

49.1

(971.8) (622.0)
7.7

14.1

(574.6) (723.3)

NY
(n=284)

77.6

88.6

75.7

(572.8)

(193.2)

(204.7)

45.8

41.8

48.6

(690.6)

(420.3)

(409.9)

38.1

41.8

35.6

(585.3)

(324.5)

(377.9)

35.5

54.4

39.4

(947.8)

(311.2)

(530.0)

9.7

12.7

10.9

(631.2)

(506.0)

(599.0)

40.1

69.6

50.0

Subsequent
Incarceration

27.4

27.8

32.8

27.5

39.3
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Table 9. Recidivism Stratified by Sex (Percent rearrested, and
mean time to first rearrest in parentheses)
Female

Any Rearrest

Violent Rearrest

Property Rearrest

Drug Rearrest

Weapons Rearrest

Subsequent Incarceration

Male

NJ

NY

NJ

NY

49.2

42.9

77.2

72.5

(1382.6)

(1650.4)

(794.2)

(944.7)

18.8

23.7

32.2

44.2

(1966.3)

(2005.1)

(1754.7)

(1495.2)

10.5

18.6

35.1

35.5

(2055.7)

(2061.0)

(1667.5)

(1627.9)

14.4

9.6

50.3

38.1

(644.0)

(901.3)

(597.6)

(862.6)

2.8

1.9

11.1

11.2

(551.8)

(1542.7)

(725.2)

(734.0)

7.7

7.7

40.2

39.1

C. Recidivism—Probability of Rearrest by Offense Type
1. Overview
We estimated proportionate hazard models using Cox regression procedures to
determine the probability of rearrest over time following sanction and return to the
community, and to see if the probability is affected by court jurisdiction. The first
proportional hazard model (Model 1) examines the effect of adult court jurisdiction on
time to rearrest for any crime. We then examine rearrest separately for four more specific
types of crimes: violent crimes, property crimes, weapons-related offenses, and drug
crimes. 174 Each of these four crimes is examined in three different ways. In the first set
of models (Models 2-5), we simply analyze time to the first rearrest for a specific type of
crime, ignoring any earlier or later rearrests for other types of crime. The models estimate
likelihood and time until rearrest on either violent offenses (Model 2), property offenses
(Model 3), weapons offenses (Model 4), or drug offenses (Model 5).
One drawback to this first set of models is that the first rearrest for a specific type
of offense (e.g., a property offense) is considered the “failure,” even when it has been
174

Violent crimes included homicide, manslaughter, felony assaults, robbery, rape, kidnap, and arson. Weapons
offenses are measured as an independent category. Property crimes included grand larceny, auto theft, and
burglary. Misdemeanors included all other penal code violations except drug offenses. Drug offenses included
sale and possession.
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preceded by a more serious rearrest (e.g., a violent offense). The second and third sets of
models address this issue in two alternative ways. The second set of models (Models 69) considers each individual’s most serious rearrest. These models each limit the set of
cases to those defendants who are rearrested, but exclude those rearrested for a more
serious type of offense. Our seriousness hierarchy orders offenses in the following
structure: violence, property, weapons, drugs, and misdemeanors. As we have already
examined the effect of adult court jurisdiction on rearrest in general (Model 1), these
models examine the effects on the seriousness of recidivism among those rearrested.
Model 6 estimates the likelihood of violent rearrest, only among those who are rearrested.
Model 7 estimates rearrest for a property offense among those rearrested but not for
violence. Model 8 estimates rearrest for a weapon offense among those rearrested, but
excluding those rearrested for violence or property crimes. Model 9 estimates rearrest for
drugs among those rearrested, but not for violence, property, or weapons offenses. The
limitation in these models is that some persons may be rearrested for a lesser crime (e.g.,
a misdemeanor compared to a felony property crime), but these models estimate only the
hazard for that person of the time to the first rearrest on the felony property offense.
The third set of models are competing risk hazard models. This set of models
examines only each defendant’s first rearrest, and compares the relative risk of rearrest at
each level of the offense-severity hierarchy for those remaining in the subsequent models.
Accordingly, Model 10 estimates whether that first rearrest was for a violent offense.
Model 11 analyzes whether the first rearrest is on a property crime, excluding those
whose first rearrest was for a violent offense. Models 12 and 13 do the same for weapon
offenses and drug offenses, respectively. At each stage, we estimate the probability of
rearrest over time for each level of severity, for those remaining after the previous
analysis. Finally, we include another proportional hazard model (Model 14) that
operationalizes recidivism as incarceration for any subsequent offense. This allows us to
examine more serious penetration into the criminal justice system.
In the discussions below, we first discuss the results of the central policy variable
– juvenile versus adult court jurisdiction. We turn later to discussion of other factors that
may interact or covary with court jurisdiction to influence recidivism rates.
2. Any Rearrest
The first hazard model is Model 1 in Table 10a examines the effect of criminal
court jurisdiction (i.e., state) on rearrest in general, without distinguishing among
different rearrest offense types. This is the most global but often-cited recidivism
dimension by which crime control policies are measured, in both the popular and
scientific literatures. As can be seen in Table 10a, after controlling for offender and
offense characteristics, there is no significant effect of adult court jurisdiction on
recidivism. Among the offense and offender covariates, the probability of rearrest is
greater for males and lower for adolescents of any ethnicity other than African-American.
Adolescent offenders with greater numbers of prior arrests and rearrests during case
processing (concurrent arrests) also are more likely to be rearrested. In addition,
conviction (court action) on the current case and longer custodial sentence lengths both
significantly predict rearrest, while longer cases are negatively associated with rearrest.
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3. Offense-Specific Models
The first of the offense-specific analyses is shown in Models 2-5 in Tables 10a
and 10b. These models estimate the likelihood of rearrest only for specific offenses,
regardless of any earlier or later rearrests for each person for any other offenses. Rearrest
probability is higher for cases adjudicated and sentenced in the adult court in New York
for both violent and property offenses, after controlling for offense, offender, and
sanction variables (Models 2 and 3, respectively). The opposite effect occurs for models
estimating probability of rearrest for drug offenses (Model 5).
The second set of offense-specific models examines the likelihood of each
individual’s most serious offense, but only for those rearrested for any offense. The
results are shown in Models 6-9 in Tables 11a and 11b. The basic finding from the first
set of models is replicated, with offenders under New York’s adult court jurisdiction
significantly more likely to be rearrested for violent and property offenses, compared to
less serious offenses (Models 6 and 7). And, again, New Jersey offenders are
significantly more likely to be rearrested for drug offenses (Model 9).
The third set of offense-specific models limit consideration to each individual’s
first rearrest, separately for each offense type. These are competing risk hazard models.
These results are shown in Models 10-13 in Tables 12a and 12b. Here, too, New York
offenders are more likely to be rearrested first for violent and property offenses (Models
10 and 11). Additionally, New York adolescents are significantly more likely than New
Jersey adolescents to be rearrested for a weapon offense as a first rearrest (Model 12).
The effect of state on likelihood of rearrest for drug offenses in the previous models
drops here, with no significant effect of state in Model 13.
The convergence of these findings using three conceptualizations of risk suggests
a robust conclusion: adolescents felony offenders whose cases are relocated to the adult
court are more likely to be arrested for violence and property offenses, and they are more
likely to be rearrested sooner. These results are adjusted for sanction severity, offense
and offender characteristics, and case processing. The consistency of the findings for
drug offenses suggests another robust conclusion.
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Table 10a. Proportionate Hazard Models of Rearrest for Specific Offenses
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Any rearrest

Rearrest for
violence

Rearrest for
property offenses

B
Demographic
0.060
Age
-0.769***
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
-0.321**
White
-0.134*
Hispanic American
-0.515***
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
-0.081
-0.093
Burglary
0.091
Associated Weapon Charge
-0.080
Bench Warrant
0.061
Detained
0.378***
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
-0.079**
Case Length (days, logged)
0.216***
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months,
0.119***
logged)
Criminal History
0.325***
# Prior Arrests (logged)
-0.045
Age at First Arrest
-0.118
History of Incarceration
0.550
Censor
Criminal vs. Juvenile
Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

-0.011
0.040
0.071
0.224
23645.835
612.749
0.000

Exp(B)

B

Exp(B)

B

Exp(B)

1.062
0.463

-0.082
-0.625***

0.921
0.535

-0.097
0.907
***
-0.859
0.424

0.726
0.874
0.598

-0.648***
-0.172*
-0.461*

0.523
0.842
0.631

-0.152
-0.006
-0.618**

0.859
0.994
0.539

0.922
0.911
1.095
0.923
1.063
1.460
0.924
1.241

-0.049
-0.420**
0.008
-0.036
0.006
0.407***
-0.099**
0.214**

0.952
0.657
1.008
0.965
1.006
1.502
0.906
1.238

-0.266*
0.098
0.139
-0.132
0.139
0.363***
-0.074
0.288**

0.766
1.103
1.149
0.876
1.149
1.437
0.928
1.334

1.005

-0.056

0.946

1.127

0.005

1.384
0.956
0.889
1.733

0.425***
0.012
0.076
-0.762

1.530
1.012
1.079
0.467

0.397***
0.009
-0.085
-1.654

1.487
1.009
0.919
0.191

0.989
1.041
1.074
1.251

0.680***
-0.104
0.107
0.267
12684.672
303.806
0.000

1.974
0.901
1.113
1.306

0.386***
-0.079
-0.004
0.303
11335.283
221.858
0.000

1.471
0.924
0.996
1.354
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Table 10b. Proportionate Hazard Models of Rearrest for Specific Offenses
(continued)
Model 4
Model 5
Rearrest
Rearrest
for weapon offenses
for drug offenses
B
Exp(B)
B
Exp(B)
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African
American)
White
Hispanic American
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months, logged)

0.026
-1.500***

1.026
0.223

0.082
-1.520***

1.085
0.219

-0.864*
-0.275
-0.841*

0.422
0.760
0.431

-0.586***
-0.205**
-0.594**

0.557
0.814
0.552

0.066
-0.132
0.111
-0.204
-0.052
0.730***
-0.262***
0.465**
-0.127

1.068
0.876
1.117
0.815
0.950
2.074
0.769
1.592
0.881

-0.158
-0.171
0.176*
0.113
0.040
0.120
-0.042
0.062
0.085*

0.854
0.843
1.193
1.119
1.041
1.127
0.959
1.064
1.089

Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration

0.219
-0.035
0.326

1.245
0.966
1.386

0.259***
-0.053
-0.161

1.296
0.948
0.851

Censor

-2.044

0.130

-0.695

0.499

Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)

0.297
0.253
0.145
-0.321
3500.178
110.681
0.000

1.346
1.288
1.156
0.725

-0.367***
0.131
0.086
0.100
13465.137
316.345
0.000

0.692
1.140
1.090
1.106

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 11a. Offense-Specific Proportionate Hazard Models of Rearrest by Most Serious
Rearrest
Model 6
Violent offense (most
serious) rearrest vs. any
less serious rearrest
B
Exp(B)
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African
American)
White
Hispanic American
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months, logged)
Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration
Censor
Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Model 7
Property offense (most
serious) rearrest vs. any
less serious rearrest
B
Exp(B)

-0.088
-0.145

0.915
0.865

-0.022
-0.131

0.978
0.877

-0.515**
-0.094
-0.003

0.597
0.911
0.997

-0.048
0.056
0.199

0.953
1.058
1.221

0.024
-0.386**
-0.059
-0.023
-0.022
0.246**
-0.048
0.063
0.053

1.024
0.680
0.943
0.978
0.978
1.278
0.953
1.065
1.054

-0.198
0.153
-0.005
-0.051
0.167
0.204
-0.089
0.148
0.083

0.820
1.165
0.995
0.950
1.181
1.226
0.914
1.159
1.087

0.279***
0.029
0.103
-0.148

1.322
1.030
1.108
0.863

0.177
-0.006
-0.138
-0.397

1.194
0.994
0.871
0.673

0.701***
-0.199*
0.096
0.060
12049.212
158.436
0.000

2.015
0.820
1.101
1.062

0.384*
-0.160
-0.035
0.122
4383.519
46.894
0.002

1.468
0.852
0.965
1.130
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Table 11b. Offense-Specific Proportionate Hazard Models of Rearrest by Most Serious
Rearrest (continued)
Model 8
Model 9
Weapon offense (most
Drug offense (most
serious) rearrest vs.
serious) rearrest vs.
any less serious rearrest1 any less serious rearrest
B
Exp(B)
B
Exp(B)
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African
American)
White
Hispanic American
Other Ethnicity

0.670*
-0.612

1.953
0.542

0.049
-0.951***

1.050
0.387

0.093
0.181
0.586

1.098
1.198
1.797

-0.653**
-0.114
-0.337

0.521
0.893
0.714

0.219
-0.161
0.092
-0.594
0.447
1.179***
-0.200
0.101
-2.537

1.245
0.851
1.097
0.552
1.563
3.252
0.818
1.106
0.079

-0.487*
-0.312
0.217
0.112
-0.028
0.139
-0.063
0.161
0.297***

0.614
0.732
1.243
1.118
0.973
1.149
0.939
1.174
1.346

Censor

-0.854*
-0.317**
0.783
-0.394

0.426
0.728
2.188
0.674

-0.029
0.079
-0.045
-0.950

0.971
1.083
0.956
0.387

Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)

2.689
-0.145
6.363
-0.992
729.616
48.414
0.001

-0.419*
-0.079
0.241
0.102
2813.770
90.661
0.000

0.658
0.924
1.273
1.108

Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months, logged)
Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration

14.723
0.865
579.722
0.371

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
1

Coefficients in this model did not coverge; results should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 12a. Competing Risk Hazard Models: Proportionate Hazard Model of First Rearrest
by Offense Severity
Model 10
Model 11
First rearrest for violence First rearrest for property
vs. any less serious first
vs. any less serious first
rearrest
rearrest
B
Exp(B)
B
Exp(B)
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
White
Hispanic American
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months - logged)
Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration
Censor
Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

-0.005
0.210

0.995
1.234

0.006
-0.044

1.006
0.957

-0.365
-0.180
0.325

0.695
0.835
1.385

-0.072
0.125
-0.113

0.931
1.133
0.893

0.128
-0.331
-0.154
-0.362
-0.018
0.250
0.033
0.036
-0.005

1.137
0.719
0.857
0.696
0.983
1.284
1.033
1.037
0.995

-0.063
0.184
0.072
0.091
0.124
0.001
0.006
0.180
0.082

0.939
1.202
1.075
1.095
1.132
1.001
1.006
1.197
1.086

0.113
0.031
0.094
-1.318

1.120
1.031
1.098
0.268

0.028
-0.021
-0.076
-2.924

1.028
0.979
0.927
0.054

1.227***
-0.248
0.274
0.114
5265.776
118.120
0.000

3.410
0.780
1.315
1.121

0.493**
-0.009
-0.113
0.084
5203.936
29.871
0.122

1.637
0.991
0.893
1.087
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Table 12b. Competing Risk Hazard Models: Proportionate Hazard Model of First
Rearrest by Offense Severity (continued)
Model 12
Model 13
First rearrest for weapons
First rearrest for
vs. any less serious first
drugs vs. any less
rearrest
serious first rearrest
B
Exp(B)
B
Exp(B)
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
White
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity

0.738**
-0.443

2.092
0.642

0.253*
-1.020***

1.287
0.360

-1.915
0.071
0.219

0.147
1.074
1.245

-0.506*
-0.160
-0.264

0.603
0.852
0.768

Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months, logged)

0.471
-0.038
-0.349
-0.948
-0.218
0.819*
-0.271*
0.259
0.312

1.602
0.962
0.705
0.387
0.804
2.269
0.763
1.295
1.366

-0.082
-0.125
0.105
0.079
0.054
0.141
0.040
-0.228
0.393***

0.922
0.882
1.111
1.083
1.056
1.151
1.040
0.796
1.481

Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration

-0.705*
-0.260*
0.125

0.494
0.771
1.133

-0.307**
-0.049
-0.072

0.736
0.952
0.931

0.624

1.867

-3.732

0.024

2.729
1.926
0.859
0.926

0.069
0.036
-0.088
0.411
4774.812
132.862
0.000

1.072
1.036
0.916
1.509

Censor
Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

1.004**
0.655
-0.152
-0.077
923.279
66.524
0.000
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4. Return to Incarceration
Model 14 (in Table 13) estimates the likelihood of being re-incarcerated on any
subsequent offense. Consistent with the above models, the results of Model 14 suggest
that prosecution in New York leads to an increased likelihood of subsequent incarceration
relative to prosecution in New Jersey.
5. Sanction-Specific Effects
A secondary analysis examined whether the effects of adult court jurisdiction are
conditional upon the types and severity of punishments handed out by the respective
courts. Given the harsher conditions of incarceration in the adult correctional system, 175
it is reasonable to hypothesize that there are iatrogenic effects of punishment in the adult
system that might elevate the risk of recidivism. We examined the effects of sanctions
through two methods. First, we included the main effect of incarceration sentence length
in the models, and we include a state x sentence length interaction to further specify the
effects of punishment in juvenile versus adult correctional contexts.
Sentence length is a significant predictor of offense-specific rearrest in four of
these 14 models (Models 1, 5, 9 and 13); however, three of these are drug rearrest
models, suggesting that sentence length has a consistent counter-deterrent effect with
regard to subsequent drug offending activity. The fourth model demonstrating a
significant effect of sentence length is Model 1, which predicts the likelihood of rearrest
for any offense. But, this model of global recidivism is heavily weighted by rearrests for
less serious offenses. Accordingly, sentence length is positively related to likelihood of
rearrest for less serious offenses, specifically drug offenses. The interaction of sentence
length with State was not significant in any of these models, implying that the
criminogenic effect of adult court jurisdiction for violent and property rearrests does not
vary as a function of sentence length.
Second, we included a variable indicating any court action, which is analogous to
conviction in either jurisdiction, and again we include an interaction with state. Court
actions significantly predict a greater likelihood of rearrest in four of the 14 models,
controlling for all other factors. Again, we found that this effect is not conditional upon
jurisdiction; the interaction term of any court action by state is not significant in any
model. We discuss later some of the theoretical implications of an adult court conviction
that might explain its iatrogenic effect on recidivism rates.

175

LONN LANZA-KADUCE ET AL., JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT STUDY: FINAL REPORT (Jan. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/statsnresearch/contractreports/juveniletransfers.pdf; Forst et al.,supra note
49.
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Table 13. Proportional Hazard Model: Subsequent Incarceration
Model 14
B
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
White
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity

Exp(B)

-0.010
-0.599**

0.990
0.549

-0.019
-0.022
-0.247

0.981
0.978
0.781

Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (months - logged)

-0.117
0.305*
0.004
0.010
0.298***
0.412***
0.074
0.106
-0.035

0.890
1.357
1.004
1.010
1.347
1.510
1.077
1.112
0.966

Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration

0.097
-0.001
0.101

1.102
0.999
1.107

Censor

-0.713

0.490

0.227*
-0.229*
-0.077
0.258
9437.366
133.546
0.000

1.255
0.795
0.925
1.294

Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action
Log Likelihood
Chi-Square
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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The preceding models examine the effects of state on recidivism while controlling
for the effects of incarceration and conviction. The state effect found was thus not
mediated by the different rates of conviction or incarceration in the two states. To
identify the mediating effects of incarceration and sanction on the primary state effects on
recidivism rates, we also re-estimated these models without controlling for conviction or
incarceration. Once again, we found no differences in the model results: removing the
variables for conviction and for sentence length failed to alter the results for state in any
of the models. 176 In other words, we used a hierarchical model to estimate the effects of
court jurisdiction with and without sanction effects, and found no difference in the effects
of court jurisdiction. Because the state effects were not increased, we find no evidence of
an adult court effect that is mediated or conditioned by its differing rates of conviction or
incarceration. Thus, the increased violent and property recidivism that follows adult court
processing is not attributable to the court's greater use of incarceration. Nor is this
increased recidivism attributed to qualitative differences in the incarceration regime,
because no significant interactions were found between state and either conviction (any
court action) or incarceration length. 177
Although the use of incarceration distinguishes the sanction severity between the
states, we also tested for the effects of sanctions other than incarceration. We constructed
ordinal variables of sanction severity based on the ordering of sanctions shown in Table
3. We constructed a four-level ordinal variable, with levels including no sanction, fine/
restitution/community service, probation/suspended sentence, 178 and incarceration. We
estimated models using this ordinal variable to contrast levels of sanction severity on
recidivism, and also as a linear predictor of sanction severity. In the latter models, we
included interaction terms of state x sanction to see if there were state-specific sanction
effects. The effects of state (court jurisdiction) were substantively the same in these
models as in Models 1-14, although there were slight differences in the coefficients and
exponentiated coefficients. 179
Finally, the basic policy test in this study is the effects of laws that place specific
age-offense groups in juvenile versus adult court for adjudication and sentencing.
Accordingly, these analyses examined the effects of original court jurisdiction on
recidivism. But there were within-state transfers in each state, including waiver to
criminal court in New Jersey, and transfer to the Family Court in New York. To further
test the effects of court jurisdiction, we re-analyzed the data with final court jurisdiction
(of sentencing) as the key predictor. Once again, the results were substantively the same,
with minor differences in the coefficients but no differences in significance or direction
of effects. 180 As a final check on these results, we re-estimated these models with only
the cases of persons age 16 at the time of offense. In New York, these cases originate in
criminal court, and cannot be transferred back to the Family Court. The results were

176

Results not shown, available from authors.
Also, the fact that the interaction terms of state by any court action and state by sentence length were
insignificant in each model reinforces the conclusion that the effect of sanction is neither conditioned nor
mediated by the effect of state in our models.
178
Most suspended incarceration sentences included terms of probation supervision.
179
Results not shown, available from authors.
180
Results not shown, available from authors.
177
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substantively the same as the models shown, although with minor differences in the
coefficients. 181
6. Offense and Offender Factors in Recidivism
The potential importance of specific offense or offender categories for assessing
waiver policy lies in the opportunity to identify subgroups for which transfer to the adult
court might have particularly salient effects on recidivism. Several offense and offender
characteristics were significant predictors of recidivism in these models. Although these
effects are consistent in their direction, there is less consistency in their statistical
significance or the effect sizes across the models. We summarize only general directional
trends here, and readers can identify meaningful specific factors from the tables.
Among offender demographic characteristics, males generally demonstrate a
greater hazard of rearrest than females, especially on drug offenses, though less clearly
for violent offenses (only 1 of 3 models predicting violent rearrest). The models also
consistently find that Whites were rearrested less often than minorities, particularly
African-American defendants. Age is significant in only two models, and is positively
related to likelihood of rearrest.
Several of the current case and criminal history characteristics are related to
likelihood of recidivism across the models. Compared to cases sampled on robbery
charges, burglary cases are associated with somewhat less violent recidivism. Having an
associated weapon charge on the sampled case helps predict recidivism in only one of the
fourteen models. Lengthier prior arrest records, and more concurrent arrests are both
associated with greater recidivism. Longer cases also are associated with lower
recidivism. Age at first arrest is negatively associated with rearrest in two models, and
pretrial detention is associated only with likelihood of subsequent incarceration. Finally,
the interaction of prior arrest record and state is significant in only two of the
proportional hazard models.
7. Controlling for Selection
We re-estimated each of these models with the addition of a selection parameter
to control for the potential effects of state differences in the samples. This selection
parameter is predicted value or propensity score from an equation predicting membership
in the New York sample. 182 The selection model was a logistic regression that included
offense and offender characteristics, such as charge, prior record, age at first offense, and
demographic characteristics. We used the predicted value from this model to control for
sample differences between the states. The results of the models including selection
parameters were unchanged. Selection did not alter the significance or effect sizes of the
state or sanction variables, nor of the offense or offender characteristics. We do not show
the results of these additional models, but the model results are available from the
authors.
A second strategy to control for selection was to analyze offense-specific models.
We re-estimated the models to insure that they were not biased by the differing charge
181
182

Results not shown, available from authors.
See Rubin, supra note __ and accompanying text.
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distributions in the two states. We re-estimated each of the competing hazard models
demonstrating statistically significant (p<0.05) effects for state jurisdiction using two
methods to search for a charge distribution bias: using only robbery cases, and including
interaction terms of robbery charge with each other variable. We specified robbery both
because of its salience as a paradigm juvenile crime category, and also because of the
strong consistency between states in the statutory language and severity grading of the
offenses. This led to the re-estimation of 20 models, ten of each method. 183
Nine of the ten re-estimations using interaction terms of robbery by each other
independent variable (other than assault and burglary) produce congruent estimates for
the state variable as the previous models. That is, the coefficient for the state variable is
still significant in 9 of the 10 models in which it was significant without the interaction
terms. The only model in which state became not a significant predictor of rearrest is the
model on subsequent incarceration, which before had demonstrated the weakest state
effect of any significant model.
When restricting the analyses to only robbery cases, half of the re-estimated
models still produced a significant coefficient for state. The models that fail to produce a
significant estimate for state include the model predicting subsequent incarceration
(which had demonstrated the weakest state effect of any model), the model predicting
rearrest for weapon offenses (which failed to converge on a best estimate and is thus not
reliable), the model predicting a property offense as the most serious rearrest, and two
models predicting drug rearrests. These two drug rearrest models are the only models
showing greater prevalence of rearrest in New Jersey. Thus, because of the overall
similarities between our initial results and the results of these correction models, we can
have greater confidence in the reliability of our findings.
8. Effect Sizes
The effect sizes for each of the hazard models are summarized in Table 14. The
exponentiated coefficents can be interpreted as odds ratios, the relative odds of reoffending for offenders in each court. An odds ratio of 1.0 indicates that there is no
difference in the odds of rearrest. An odds ratio of 2.0 indicates that the odds double, and
an odds ratio of .5 means that the odds are halved. Unfortunately, translating odds ratios
to effects on the probability or likelihood of rearrest is not straightforward. To help
interpretation of these effect sizes we provide the comparable odds ratios associated with
the bivariate effects for violent, property, and drug rearrest. In each case, the effects
associated with the hazard models are larger than those apparent from the bivariate
results (shown earlier in Table 5).

183

Results not shown.
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Table 14. Summary of Exponentiated Coefficients and Significance Tests for Court,
Sanction and Interaction Effects on Hazard Rates for Rearrest and Reincarceration

Model

Main Effects
State
Sentence
(Court)
Length

Recidivism
OffenseSpecific
Hazard
Any Offense
Violent
Property
Weapons
Drug Offenses

.989
1.974 ***
1.471 ***
1.345
.692 ***

Most Serious
Rearrest
Violent
Property
Weapons
Drug Offenses

2.015 ***
1.468 *
14.723
.658 *

1.054
1.087
1.079
1.346 ***

First Rearrest
Violent
Property
Weapons
Drug Offenses

3.4510 ***
1.637 *
2.729 *
1.072

.995
1.086
1.366
1.481

Incarceration

1.255 *

.966

1.127
1.005
.946
.881
1.081

State Interactions
Sentence
Priors
Length
Conviction

1.041
.901
.924
1.228
1.140

1.074
1.113
.996
1.156
1.090

1.251
1.306
1.354
.725
1.106

.820
.852
.865
.924

1.101
.965
5.975
1.273

1.062
1.130
.371
1.108

.780
.991
1.926
1.036

1.315
.893
.859
.916

1.121
1.087
.926
1.509

.925

1.294

.795 *

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

In the models when state is a significant predictor of recidivism, effect sizes vary
between offense types, but are consistent within offense types. For the three violent
offense comparisons, adolescents adjudicated and sentenced in the criminal court had
odds of rearrest were two to three times higher over the follow-up period than youth
sanctioned in the juvenile court. For comparison, these are larger effects than appear in
the bivariate results, which showed 30% of the juvenile court sample compared to 42% of
the criminal court sample were rearrested for a violent crime. The odds ratio for this
bivariate difference equals 1.68. After controlling for time to rearrest, and a variety of
statistical controls, we find the effect actually increased to nearly 2.0, or twice as likely.
Similarly for property rearrests, where 30.9% of the NJ offenders were rearrested,
compared to 33.5% of NY offenders. At the bivariate level, this generates a 13% increase
in the odds or rearrest. However, in our multivariate hazard models, criminal court
processing increases the odds of rearrest by 47% to 64%. For weapons rearrests, only
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one of three comparisons was significant, and in that model, youths sanctioned in the
criminal court had higher odds of rearrest 2.7. For drug rearrests, bivariate results found
44% of juvenile court youth rearrested compared to 35% of criminal court youth, for a
33% decrease in odds of rearrest. The hazard models show comparable effects.
Youths adjudicated and sanctioned in the criminal court had far higher odds of
reincarceration – 25.5% higher – over the course of the follow-up period. Almost none
of the other comparisons of the punishment variables were significant.
Again, the consistent results across models suggests that there is a significant
risks of increases in arrests for felony violence and felony property crimes when
adolescent felony offenders are adjudicated in the criminal court. One model suggest that
weapons offenses are likely to increase for youths sentenced in the criminal court. Drug
offenses are more likely to recur when youths are sanctioned in the juvenile court.
D. Recidivism: Offending Rates
The above hazard models analyze likelihood of re-offending as a function of time
but do not take into account the number of times individuals are rearrested. We
computed the number of rearrests for each individual following their court sentence, and
controlled for their time at risk, or the time when they were returned to the communityh
with the opportunity to commit new crimes. To determine the comparative impacts of
court jurisdiction on rearrest counts, we estimated both offense-general and offensespecific negative binomial regression models. Tables 15a and 15b show the results of
these analyses.
Overall, the results of the negative binomial models (Models 15-19) are similar to
the hazard model results reported above. In two of the five models – models measuring
rearrest for violent offenses and for property offenses – prosecution in New York is
associated with a significantly higher frequency of rearrest. And, prosecution in New
Jersey is associated with a significantly higher frequency of rearrest for drug offenses.
Tables 15a and 15b show that that sanctions (case outcome) is positively related
to number of overall rearrests and property offense rearrests. However, the results
concerning sentence length diverge from our previous tests. Unlike the proportional
hazard models of rearrest prevalence over time, the negative binomial models suggest
that longer custodial sentence lengths have a deterrent effect on number of rearrests.
Each model other than the drug offense model (Model 19) demonstrates a negative and
significant effect of custodial sentence length. Mirroring the previous results, we find no
significant effects from any of the interaction terms in any negative binomial models.
Among other variables, the most consistent predictors of rearrest in these models
are number of prior arrests (which is significant and positively related in every model
other than Model 18) and number of concurrent arrests (significant and positively related
in two of the models). The length of case processing is negatively related to the number
of all rearrest types other than drug offenses. We find no robust effect for either variable
indicating burglary or arrest charges, relative to robbery cases.
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Table 15a. Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Offense-Specific Rearrests
Model 16

Model 17

Violent Offenses

Property Offenses

Model 15
All Rearrests

B

t

Demographic
-0.164 -3.461**
Age
-0.911-13.395***
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
-0.426 -4.791***
White
-0.086 -1.688
Hispanic American
-0.371 -3.789***
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
-0.102 -1.543
Aggravated Assault
-0.079 -1.031
Burglary
0.040 0.789
Associated Weapon Charge
0.002 0.848
Bench Warrant
0.038 0.752
Detained
0.002 2.721**
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
-0.107 -4.383***
Case Length (days, logged)
0.127 2.492*
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence (mos., logged) -0.130 -3.731***
Criminal History
# Prior Arrests (logged)
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration

0.408 7.809***
-0.006 -0.240
-0.097 -0.984

Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
-0.026 -0.406
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
0.032 0.451
State x Prior Arrests
-0.058 -0.851
State x Incarceration Length
0.136 1.300
State x Any Court Action
Constant
Time-at-risk
Dispersion Parameter
Predictor of Censor
Log likelihood function
Chi-squared
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

4.676
0.000
0.741
1.655

7.036 ***
-5.755 ***
18.327 ***
1.538

-4990.08
1713.40
0.000

B

t

B

t

-0.222 -3.670***
-0.426 -4.680***

-0.242 -3.394**
-0.755 -6.680***

-0.439 -3.422**
-0.120 -1.813
-0.275 -1.906

-0.051 -0.372
0.111 1.414
-0.292 -1.885

0.096
-0.352
-0.057
0.001
-0.044
0.001
-0.068
0.013
-0.096

-0.212
0.193
0.024
0.004
0.148
0.000
-0.131
0.212
-0.170

1.201
-3.446**
-0.858
0.401
-0.658
0.573
-2.204*
0.192
-2.393*

0.433 6.852***
0.014 0.482
-0.039 -0.354
0.317
-0.057
0.011
0.109

3.975***
-0.686
0.138
0.798

3.992
0.000
0.593
1.693

4.605 ***
-6.850 ***
8.369 ***
1.599

-2762.784
171.46
0.000

-1.991*
1.585
0.298
0.484
1.896
0.243
-3.465**
2.581*
-3.325**

0.420 5.423***
0.008 0.232
-0.121 -0.802
0.356
-0.089
-0.180
0.095

3.303**
-0.822
-1.812
0.583

4.376 4.159 ***
0.000 -3.432 **
1.386 13.422 ***
2.304 1.604
-2843.061

726.98
0.000
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Table 15b. Negative Binomial Regression of Number of Offense Specific Rearrests
Model 18

Model 19

Weapon Offenses

Drug Offenses

B
Demographic
Age
Female
Ethnicity (Contrast=African American)
White
Hispanic American
Other Ethnicity
Current Case
Current Charge (Contrast=Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Bench Warrant
Detained
# Concurrent Arrests (logged)
Case Length (in days, logged)
Any Court Action
Custodial Sentence Length (months, logged)

t

B

t

-0.004
-1.429

-0.028
-4.293***

-0.036
-1.747

-0.484
-12.099***

-0.960
-0.442
-0.798

-2.810**
-2.629**
-1.963*

-0.752
-0.220
-0.505

-5.366***
-2.548*
-3.163**

0.097
-0.064
0.094
0.001
-0.014
-0.001
-0.193
0.293
-0.226

0.485
-0.274
0.607
0.070
-0.093
-0.622
-2.793**
1.803
-2.052*

-0.216
-0.129
0.203
0.004
0.027
0.001
-0.043
0.042
-0.039

-2.154*
-1.061
2.558*
0.426
0.318
0.441
-1.118
0.519
-0.819

Criminal History
# Prior Arrests
Age at First Arrest
History of Incarceration
Criminal vs. Juvenile Jurisdiction
State (Contrast=New Jersey)
State x Prior Arrests
State x Incarceration Length
State x Any Court Action

0.221
-0.055
0.344

1.552
-0.877
1.390

0.366
-0.009
-0.250

4.405***
-0.214
-1.703

0.238
0.142
0.121
-0.553

1.145
0.752
0.545
-1.637

-0.365
0.162
-0.092
0.217

-3.757***
1.479
-1.004
1.291

Constant
Time-at-risk
Dispersion Parameter
Censor

0.100
0.000
1.250
-0.267

0.049
-1.857
3.005 **
-0.089

1.007
0.000
1.487
0.050

1.087
1.022
13.702 ***
0.041

Log likelihood function
Chi-squared
p(Chi-Square)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

-853.900
22.990
0.000

-2970.610
868.790
0.000
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Several offender characteristics are significantly related to arrest counts as well.
The variable for age is significant and negatively related to overall, violent and property
offense arrests. Males are more likely than females to have greater numbers of rearrests
in each model. Overall, with regard to ethnicity, African-Americans are more likely than
other groups to be rearrested a greater number of times. This effect is significant relative
to each other ethnic group for any rearrest (Model 15), weapon offense rearrests (Model
18), and drug offense rearrests (Model 19), and significant relative to whites for violent
offense rearrests (Model 16).
In sum, we find that the number of rearrests is conditioned by jurisdiction –
prosecution in New York is related to higher rates for violent and property offenses,
though prosecution in New Jersey is related to higher rates of drug offenses. This mirrors
our results from the hazard rate analyses and adds to our confidence in these results.
With regard to the effect of court outcomes on recidivism, we find mixed results. We
find that conviction is related to greater numbers of rearrests, but that custodial sentence
length is related to fewer rearrests.
To test for selection effects on these results, we computed a selection parameter to
estimate the effects of sample differences on these models. We used the same selection
parameter used in the hazard models of recidivism prevalence and reincarceration. This
selection parameter is predicted value or propensity score from an equation predicting
membership in the New York sample. 184 We then include this parameter when reestimating each negative binomial model (shown above in Tables 15a and 15b as Models
15 to 19). Table 16 summarizes the results of the negative binomial models by listing the
coefficients for state and their significance in each model, both with185 and without this
selection parameter. As Table 16 demonstrates, including this selection parameter does
not alter the coefficient for state in any of the negative binomial models. As a result, we
are confident that we adequately control for differences between cases in New York and
New Jersey in our analyses, and that our results are free from sample selection bias that
might arise from such differences.

184
185

See Rubin, supra note 135.
The first column of coefficients for state in Table 15 is taken from Models 15 to 19 in Tables 15a and 15b.
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Table 16. Summary of Negative Binomial Regression Results for State
Effects for Various Models, With and Without State Selection
Parameter

Model
All Rearrests

Unadjusted State Effects

Adjusted State Effects

Estimate

Estimate

t

p(t)

-0.026 -0.406
***

t

p(t)

-0.029-0.436
0.305 3.802***

Rearrests for Violent Offenses

0.317 3.975

Rearrests for Property Offenses

0.356 3.303**

0.336 2.991**

Rearrests for Weapon Offenses

0.238 1.145

0.257 1.230

Rearrests for Drug Offenses

***

-0.365 -3.757

-0.337-3.438**

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

E. Summary of Results Across Models
Several trends are apparent across the models discussed above. First, it appears
that jurisdiction does have an impact on recidivism, but this effect varies based on
offense type measured. Net of all other factors, prosecution in New York consistently
leads to greater likelihood of rearrest for violent and property offenses, and of subsequent
incarceration. These offense categories were focal concerns in the legislative activism to
increase the use of criminal courts for sentencing and punishment of adolescent felony
offenders. The evidence here of increases in offending rates for these crime types is
particularly ironic in light of the emphasis in these social and legal policies on serious
and violent crime. This is especially true for defendants with no prior records, some o of
whom are incarcerated under sentences that are structured by law.
Transfer policies often are justified by policy-makers as effective resources for
deterring violent crimes among adolescents. 186 This seems not to be true in this study,
nor in others examining this policy question. We conclude that the counter-deterrence of
criminal court is not due to the increased prison time served by adolescents prosecuted in
criminal court compared to their juvenile court counterparts, because our state effects
were found in models that controlled for the effect of sentence length. (Nor did the state
effects increase in models which left sentence length uncontrolled.) We also fail to find
evidence that the equivalent incarceration length has a different effect in the two states.
Whatever qualitative differences there may be in the incarceration experience, it does not
seem to be responsible for the criminogenic effect of adult court processing. What, then,
explains the distinction in recidivism we find between New York and New Jersey? There
are several possible explanations for this discrepancy, including police preferences for
arrest and the closer supervision of adolescents on juvenile probation caseloads, or the

186

SINGER, supra note 12; Zimring & Fagan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, supra note 51.

2007]

FAGAN, KUPCHIK AND LIBERMAN

67

iatrogenic effects of adult court participation on adolescent offenders. These theories
await further research.
Second, we find variable effects of court sanctions on recidivism– regardless of
whether the sanctions are expressed by the juvenile or adult court. Sanction, or court
action – analogous to conviction – also is a consistent predictor of a heightened risk of
recidivism. This suggests that adolescents are less likely to re-offend if their cases are
diverted from court or dismissed. Oddly, custodial sentence length is a significant
predictor of a heightened risk of recidivism in two of the proportional hazard models, yet
a significant predictor of a lowered risk of recidivism in several of the negative binomial
models. The lack of significant results from the interaction term of state by sentence
length suggest that these results are not due to an interaction effect between sentence
length and court type – in other words, incarceration does not have an effect that is
specific to either court jurisdiction. Given that the proportional hazard models estimate
the likelihood only of a first rearrest, yet the negative binomial models estimate the
overall number of rearrests, this distinction might be due to different short-term and longterm consequences of imprisonment. That is, perhaps prison sentences have a negative,
counter-deterrent short-term effect, but a positive, deterrent long-term effect. This should
be explored through further research.
Third, we find that overall, previous behavior is a good indicator of future
behavior. The variables we include for prior arrest record and rearrests during case
processing are fairly consistent predictors (though with some exceptions) of greater
likelihood of rearrest, especially when measuring rearrest for more serious offenses. Age
at first arrest also significantly predicts recidivism in two models; though this finding is
not robust, it suggests that beginning a criminal record at a younger age may be related to
persistence of a criminal career.
Fourth, we find that arrest charge on the sampled case is not a very good predictor
of recidivism. This is an important result, for it helps demonstrate that the abundance of
robbery cases in the New York sub-sample does not bias our results. Moreover, we reestimate several models to ensure that the differing arrest charge distributions between
New York and New Jersey do not bias our results; the results of each of these tests
confirms that our data are sound.
Finally, we find that several demographic variables are significant predictors of
recidivism. Both sex and ethnicity have significant effects in several of our competing
hazard models. This suggests that the likelihood of rearrest is greater for males than
females and for African Americans relative to adolescents of other ethnicities. We are
unable to determine based on our data if these results are due to disparate behavioral
patterns or to different policing along these demographic boundaries.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Prior research has strongly suggested that prosecuting adolescents as adults leads
to more, not less, crime. This is true for almost all studies asking this question, regardless
of methodology. Our results add to what now is a consistent series of empirical studies
showing that adolescents prosecuted and sentenced in criminal court are at significantly
greater risk of rearrest for violent and felony property offenses, their risks accrue more
quickly, and they are more likely to be subsequently incarcerated than matched samples
of adolescents prosecuted in juvenile courts. That these results appear in studies that
reflect a range of sampling and measurement conditions, as well as statutory and social
structural contexts, suggests a robustness in these findings that demands policy attention.
Despite repeated promises by politicians that being tough on crime by prosecuting
children as adults will decrease crime and protect the community, 187 we find that transfer
to criminal court actually may increase the risk of violent and other serious crime by
adolescents and young adults, increasing public safety risks for citizens while heavily
mortgaging the possibility of reformation or prosocial development for many transferred
offenders. The results suggest that policies facilitating “wholesale waiver,” or categorical
exclusion of certain groups of adolescents based solely on offense and age, are ineffective
at specific deterrence of serious crime, despite political rhetoric insisting the opposite,
and invite avoidable public safety risks. We are confident that these results reflect
systematic differences and are not the product of selection: the matching procedures used
to construct this natural experiment and the inclusion of selection parameters in the
analyses leave us confident that these results are valid and real.
A. Jurisprudential Implications
Given that the interaction between custodial sentence length and state does not
help predict violent or property offense rearrests, we conclude that the counter-deterrence
of criminal court is not due to the increased prison time served by adolescents prosecuted
in criminal court compared to their juvenile court counterparts. What, then, explains the
distinction in recidivism we find between New York and New Jersey?
We look to two potential explanations that might identify the dynamics that
produce higher recidivism rates for adolescents in criminal court. First, systematic
differences in the court and correctional experiences of adolescents in the criminal courts
may expose them to harsh punishments at one end of the sanction continuum, or to
ineffective and diffuse supervision for those sentenced to probation. Second, the effects
of felony conviction on subsequent employment 188 or citizenship 189 or entry to other
187

See SINGER, supra note 12; Sara Raymond, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Violence and Juvenile
Crime Prevention Act of 1998 Does to California's Juvenile Justice System and Reasons to Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 233, 258-289 (2000). The criteria for transfer include an offense that would be punishable by
death or life imprisonment if committed by an adult; the use of a firearm in committing a felony; or an accusation
that the youth committed any crime in conjunction with a street gang, for the purpose of interfering with a
victim's constitutional rights, or against a victim sixty-five-years-old or older. Id.; P. Wilson, How is Juvenile
Justice Served?, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2000.
188
J. Fagan & R. Freeman, Crime and Work, in 25 CRIME AND JUSTICE 225 (1999)
189
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2002).
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prosocial adult roles 190 suggest that some aspects of adolescent development are heavily
mortgaged when adolescents are tried as adults, complicating their transition from
adolescence to adulthood. Third, juvenile courts may be able to reduce recidivism
through methods that are less visible and less measurable, such as through a complex
array of counseling and treatment programs that we do not account for in our analyses.
Another possibility stems from a symbolic interaction, or labeling, perspective.191
Perhaps prosecution in criminal court symbolically communicates to adolescents that
they are unsalvageable, or that they are adult offenders rather than juvenile delinquents,
and these messages in turn produce inflated offending activity via a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Future research should examine these very real possibilities of secondary
deviance, or classical labeling theory, as an explanation for the elevated rates of
recidivism among transferred adolescents.
An equally important research agenda should assess the perceived deterrent
effects of sanction experiences in each court. Applying an integrative theory of
deterrence can refocus the effects of court sanctions on the assessments of the costs and
rewards both of offending and punishment. We urge that research consider that the
iatrogenic effects of criminal court may result from the domains of both distributive and
procedural justice that distinguish the two court contexts. Within this framework, future
research should reflect the developmental stage of adolescents and the processes of legal
socialization that are animated by their court experiences.
Future research also should consider our finding that prosecution in New Jersey
juvenile courts is a significant predictor of drug offense recidivism. This conclusion is
consistent with the claims of the juvenile court’s critics who argue that juvenile courts are
net-widening institutions. 192 It is possible that prosecution in New Jersey’s juvenile
courts alerts local law enforcement that certain youth are “trouble-makers” and deserve
greater scrutiny than other adolescents. Thus by including youth under a parens patriae
mandate the juvenile court makes adolescents more susceptible than other adolescents to
arrest for petty crimes. Alternatively, transfer to criminal court may partially achieve its
intended effect of reducing crime, though only for drug offenses. These possibilities
deserve further consideration through continued research.
B. Implications for Law and Policy
Overall, based on our research and on previous studies it seems clear that policies
facilitating “wholesale waiver,” or transfer to criminal court of large groups of
adolescents based solely on offense and age, fail to deter serious and violent crime. This
failure occurs despite the political rhetoric insisting the opposite. However, we
understand the necessity of transferring some adolescents to criminal court – this is
necessitated by the principle of penal proportionality, which would be violated by all
violent adolescents receiving punishment through the traditionally more lenient juvenile
court. 193 Thus the community must be protected from predatory youth who are unlikely
190

R.J. SAMPSON & J.H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING (1993)
See E. SCHUR, INTERPRETING DEVIANCE (1979).
192
FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2; E. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE (1970).
193
F. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1.
191
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to be helped by treatment-oriented or supervisory sanctions, but delinquent youth also
must be protected from the overreach of wholesale waiver.
In practice, the normative and empirical tension in setting these boundaries poses
a challenge to lawmakers that is simply ignored when legislators retreat to the simplistic
overreach of legislative exclusion and its “wholesale waiver” policies. There are
competing risks in the development of waiver policy, and calibration of the threshold
itself and also the mechanism for crossing it, are complex questions. Some transfer
mechanisms may invite higher error rates than others, regardless of where the boundary is
actually set. The prediction of seriousness and risk cannot occur without entertaining two
types of error, both those over-predicted to re-offend and those whose recidivism risks
are underestimated. The two predictions are linked, and the evaluation of waiver or
transfer as public policy requires that both types of risk be considered. Such is the
dilemma and ethical responsibility of the regulator. 194 Given the necessity of transferring
some adolescents to criminal court, policy-makers should adopt methods of risk
prediction that – as shown in this study – offer more accurate predictions of public safety
risk in determining which offenders are expelled from the juvenile court.
Returning to discretionary transfer rather than “wholesale waiver” would limit the
number of youth subjected to criminal court prosecution, and better screen out youth who
may be amenable to treatment in the juvenile court. Yet this method would also ensure
proportional punishment for adolescents whose crimes are too serious to maintain the
legitimacy of adjudication in the juvenile court.
Of course, suggesting a return to discretionary transfer begs the question of how
youth should be selected for transfer. Volumes of prior research suggest that past
attempts to select youth for transfer often are unsuccessful at selecting the most serious
offenders, 195 and reinforce racial discrimination in the selection process. 196 Therefore, a
more careful screening process for selecting youth to be prosecuted as adults is crucial.
Such a system must minimize both false negatives and false positives.
False negatives, or failing to select youth who are likely to re-offend, clearly are
the main concern of policy makers who facilitate the transfer of youths to criminal court.
The fear that predatory children are treated with “kid gloves” in the juvenile court is the
reason for the recent erosion of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction through transfer laws. 197
We agree that some youth should be transferred to criminal court, but we need methods
that are less inclusive for selecting transfer candidates and subject fewer children to the
stigmatization and punishment liability of criminal court.
Indeed, current over-inclusive transfer laws minimize the chance of false
negatives, but in doing so they maximize the likelihood of false positives. That is, by
transferring so many youths to criminal court, transfer policies subject many adolescents
who would benefit from a juvenile court’s rehabilitative services to criminal court
punishment. Our research – as well as other studies before us – find a significant risk to

194

C. CRANOR, THE REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES (1993).
See Bishop, supra note 84.
196
See M.A. Bortner et al., Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social Context, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1.
197
E.g., SINGER, supra note 12; L.J. Collier, Adult Crime, Adult Time: Outdated Juvenile Laws Thwart Justice,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998; Wilson, supra note 154.
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individual adolescents and to the community of increasing the number of false negative
cases.
A more sensible system for jurisdictional transfer would return the discretion to
juvenile court judges to select juveniles based on more criteria than age and instant
offense. We recommend that this function return to judges, whose decisions are less
influenced by the politics of crime and the electoral pressures to avoid risks while
exacting retribution. 198 Judges should be able to decide which adolescents should be
transferred, within an open and transparent forum and using Kent-like criteria and social
scientific knowledge of adolescent development. Our hope is that such a system could
simultaneously protect vulnerable youth who are amenable to rehabilitation, and protect
the community from those most likely to re-offend. A jurisprudence of discretionary
decision making on transfer would also promote two ancillary goals: it would promote
accountability for decision makers that is diffused in a statutory context where legislators
surgically remove entire classes of offenders from the juvenile court. A regime of
individualized decision making would take seriously the responsibility for mistakes on
both sides of the decision threshold.
A now extensive oeuvre of empirical research suggest that past attempts to
individually select youth for transfer often are unsuccessful at selecting the most serious
offenders, 199 and reinforce racial discrimination in the selection process. 200 These
processes are correctable by regulatory mechanisms that can anticipate these trends and
offer corrective interventions. Accordingly, we suggest that more careful screening
processes for selecting youth to be prosecuted as adults are crucial, and that transparency
and constant assessment can calibrate where the borders should be set and measure the
performance of those making transfer decisions. Such a system will take seriously the
risks both false negatives and false positives, risks that are inherent in modern juvenile
and criminal justice. As a regulatory question, the nation’s recurring social experiment to
criminalize delinquency has unfolded with limited research and little analysis. The
declines in juvenile crime present an opportunity for experimentation on waiver and
transfer as a public policy question. Opening the transfer process to regulation and
deliberation can lay the foundation for more effective and principled policies.
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Appendix A1. Target Charges Statutory Comparison: Robbery
Common Definition of Charge

New York Elements of Charge

Robbery:

More Severe

Physically attacking, injuring
or threatening a person with or
without a deadly weapon,
while stealing property from
that person

NY: 160.15,
B Felony
NJ: 2C:15-1, 1st o

Less Severe
NY: 160.10, C
Felony
NJ: 2C:15-1, 2nd o

In the course of stealing property or in flight from
the crime, he:
1. Causes serious physical injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime; or
2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm.

Forcibly stealing property and when:
1. He is aided by another person actually
present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the
crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he
or another participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person
who is not a participant in the crime; or
(b) Displays what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm; or
3. The property consists of a motor vehicle, as
defined in section one hundred twenty-five
of the vehicle and traffic law.

New Jersey Elements of Charge
Robbery is a crime of the first degree if in the course of
committing the theft the actor:
1. Attempts to kill anyone, or
2. Purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious
bodily injury, or
3. Is armed with, or uses or threatens the
immediate use of a deadly weapon.

A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he:
1. Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon
another; or
2. Threatens another with or purposely puts him
in fear of immediate bodily injury; or
3. Commits or threatens immediately to commit
any crime of the first or second degree.
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Appendix A2. Target Charges Statutory Comparison: Assault

Common Definition of Charge
Assault:
Physically attacking,
injuring or
threatening a person
with or without a
deadly weapon, or
attempting to cause
injury with or
without a deadly
weapon

More Severe
NY: 120.10,
1st o, B
Felony
NJ: 2C:121(b), 2nd o

Less Severe
NY: 120.05,
2nd o,
C Felony
NJ: 2C:12
-1(b), 3rd o

New York Elements of Charge
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:

1. Intentionally causes serious physical
injury to another person or a third
person by means of a deadly weapon
or a dangerous instrument; or
2. Intentionally disfigures, amputates or
disables permanently a member or
body organ; or
3. Evinces a depraved indifference to
human life, recklessly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another person
4. Causes serious physical injury to a
person other than one of the
participants.in the course of an
assault, or of immediate flight
therefrom

New Jersey Elements of Charge
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
1. Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes
such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
recklessly causes such injury; or
2. Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or
attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, or during an
auto or other vehicle theft

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:

1. Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

2. Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes
significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or
3. Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a
firearm
4. Same as 3, at a law enforcement officer
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Appendix A3. Target Charges Statutory Comparison: Burglary
Common Definition of Charge
Burglary:
Unlawfully entering a
dwelling or structure
with intentions to
commit a crime, with or
without a weapon
physically injuring a
person

More Severe
NY: 140.30,
2nd o,, ,
B Felony
NJ: 2C:18-2b,
2nd o

Less Severe
NY: 120.05,
2nd o,
C Felony
NJ: 2C:18-2a,
3rd o

New York Elements of Charge

New Jersey Elements of Charge

A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree
when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein,
and when, in effecting entry or while in the
dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or
another participant in the crime:
1. Is armed with explosives or a deadly
weapon; or
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is
not a participant in the crime; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm (but only if not operable);

A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a research facility,
structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof,
unless the structure was at the time open to the public or the
actor is licensed or privileged to enter, and

A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree
when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein,
and when, in effecting entry or while in the
dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or
another participant in the crime:
5. Is armed with explosives or a deadly
weapon; or
6. Causes physical injury to any person who is
not a participant in the crime; or
7. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a
dangerous instrument; or
8. Displays what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or
other firearm (but only if not operable)

A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a research facility,
structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof,
unless the structure was at the time open to the public or the
actor is licensed or privileged to enter,

1. Purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to
inflict or threatens to inflict bodily injury on anyone; or

2. Is armed with or displays what appear to be explosives
or a deadly weapon

.
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Appendix A4. Statutory Citations and Language

I. New York Penal Laws
A) § 160.15; Robbery in the first degree
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and when, in the
course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in
the crime:
1. Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except
that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver,
rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily
capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained
in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery
in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.
Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony.

B) § 160.10; Robbery in the second degree
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property and when:
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another
participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(b) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
3. The property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five of the
vehicle and traffic law.
Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.

C) § 120.10; Assault in the first degree
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or
disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third
person; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical
injury to another person; or
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or of
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immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury
to a person other than one of the participants.
Assault in the first degree is a class B felony.

D) § 120.05; Assault in the second degree
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person
or to a third person; or
2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a
third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
3. With intent to prevent a peace officer, police officer, a fireman, including a fireman acting as a
paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of
duty as such fireman, an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service
technician, or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department, from performing a
lawful duty, by means including releasing or failing to control an animal under circumstances
evincing the actor's intent that the animal obstruct the lawful activity of such peace officer, police
officer, fireman, paramedic or technician, he causes physical injury to such peace officer, police
officer, fireman, paramedic, technician or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency
department; or
4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a
dangerous instrument; or
5. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor,
unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to him,
without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or
6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony, other
than a felony defined in article one hundred thirty which requires corroboration for conviction, or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes physical injury to a
person other than one of the participants; or
7. Having been charged with or convicted of a crime and while confined in a correctional facility, as
defined in subdivision three of section forty of the correction law, pursuant to such charge or
conviction, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such
person or to a third person; or
8. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than
eleven years old, the defendant recklessly causes serious physical injury to such person; or
9. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than
seven years old, the defendant causes such injury to such person; or
10. Acting at a place the person knows, or reasonably should know, is on school grounds and with
intent to cause physical injury, he or she:
(a) causes such injury to an employee of a school or public school district; or
(b) not being a student of such school or public school district, causes physical injury to another, and
such other person is a student of such school who is attending or present for educational purposes.
For purposes of this subdivision the term "school grounds" shall have the meaning set forth in
subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter.Assault in the second degree is a class D
felony.
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11. With intent to cause physical injury to a train operator, ticket inspector, conductor or bus operator
employed by any transit agency, authority or company, public or private, whose operation is
authorized by New York state or any of its political subdivisions, he or she causes physical injury to
such train operator, ticket inspector, conductor or bus operator while such employee is performing an
assigned duty on, or directly related to, the operation of a train or bus.

E) § 140.30; Burglary in the first degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in
a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effecting entry or while in the
dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except
that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver,
rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily
capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged.
Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a
conviction of, burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree or any other crime.
Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony.

II. New Jersey Penal Laws
A) NJ ST 2C:15-1; First- & Second-Degree Robbery
Robbery defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:
(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or
(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or
(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree.
An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs
in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
b. Grading. Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in
the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts
to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly
weapon.
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B) NJ ST 2C:12-1; Assault (First-, Second-, Third-, and Fourth-Degree)
a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; oR
(3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.
Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by
mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.
b. Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly
or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes
such injury; or
(2) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon; or
(3) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(4) Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the
actor believes it to be loaded; or
(5) Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon:
(a) Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or
exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or
(b) Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or
otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman;
or
(c) Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance
of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the
performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or
(d) Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other
employee of a school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of
his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a school board or any school
bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a school board while clearly
identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a
school bus driver; or
(e) Any employee of the Division of Youth and Family Services while clearly identifiable as
being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the
division; or
(f) Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or
municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial
duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or
(g) Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail
passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties
or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an
employee of a rail passenger service; or
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(6) Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement
officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation
of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a
person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection
b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10
which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or
(7) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury
purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or
(8) Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in
violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel
involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire
or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or
explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or
explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be
limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical
services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of
N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or
(9) Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,
points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a
law enforcement officer; or
(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection f. of
N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate,
threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or
(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner
used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a
law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting
evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any
system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is
used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm.
Aggravated assault under subsections b. (1) and b. (6) is a crime of the second degree; under
subsections b. (2), b. (7), b. (9) and b. (10) is a crime of the third degree; under subsections b. (3) and
b. (4) is a crime of the fourth degree; and under subsection b. (5) is a crime of the third degree if the
victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under
subsection b.(8) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers
significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated
assault under subsection b.(11) is a crime of the third degree.
C) NJ ST 2C: 18-2; Burglary
a. Burglary defined. A person is guilty of burglary if, with purpose to commit an offense therein he:
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(1) Enters a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof unless the
structure was at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter; or
(2) Surreptitiously remains in a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or occupied
portion thereof knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so.
b. Grading. Burglary is a crime of the second degree if in the course of committing the offense, the
actor:
(1) Purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to inflict or threatens to inflict bodily injury
on anyone; or
(2) Is armed with or displays what appear to be explosives or a deadly weapon.

Otherwise burglary is a crime of the third degree. An act shall be deemed "in the course of
committing" an offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit an offense or in immediate flight after the
attempt or commission.
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Appendix B1. Sample Characteristics: Means and Standard Deviations
New York
Mean

New Jersey

Std. Dev. Mean

Total Sample

Std. Dev. Mean

Std. Dev.

Demographics
Age

16.21

0.55

16.04

0.56

16.13

0.56

0.88

0.32

0.83

0.38

0.86

0.35

African-American

0.58

0.49

0.55

0.50

0.57

0.50

Hispanic

0.32

0.47

0.26

0.44

0.30

0.46

White

0.05

0.22

0.13

0.34

0.09

0.28

Other

0.05

0.21

0.06

0.23

0.05

0.22

Robbery

0.80

0.40

0.25

0.44

0.56

0.50

Aggravated Assault

0.15

0.36

0.43

0.50

0.28

0.45

Burglary

0.04

0.21

0.31

0.46

0.16

0.37

Associated Weapon Charge

0.41

0.49

0.35

0.48

0.39

0.49

Detained by Court

0.47

0.50

0.41

0.49

0.45

0.50

Warrant Ordered by Court

0.08

0.27

0.19

0.39

0.13

0.33

Prior Arrests (logged)

0.49

0.63

1.06

0.97

0.75

0.85

Concurrent Arrests (logged)

0.13

0.31

0.37

0.53

0.24

0.44

15.55

1.23

14.58

1.74

15.12

1.55

0.14

0.35

0.04

0.20

0.10

0.30

140.71

145.38

204.63

320.01

169.18

241.49

Conviction

0.55

0.50

0.57

0.49

0.56

0.50

Custodial Sentence Length

0.58

1.26

0.19

0.70

0.40

1.06

Sex (0=female; 1=male)
Race Variables:

Legal Variables
Current Offense:

Age at First Arrest
Previously Incarcerated
Case Length (days logged)
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Appendix B2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Two-tailed) of Predictor Variables and Recidivism
Prevalence Measures*
Any
Rearrest

Rearrest for
Violence

Rearrest for
Property
Offense

Rearrest for
Weapon
Offense

Rearrest for
Drug Offense

Age

0.01

0.02

0.00

0.01

0.00

Sex

0.22

0.13

0.16

0.10

0.22

African American

0.08

0.09

0.02

0.07

0.07

Hispanic

-0.02

-0.01

0.02

-0.02

-0.01

White

-0.04

-0.11

-0.02

-0.05

-0.06

Other Ethnicity

-0.10

-0.05

-0.06

-0.04

-0.06

0.03

0.12

0.05

0.01

0.00

-0.03

-0.04

-0.07

0.00

-0.01

Burglary

0.00

-0.11

0.03

-0.01

0.01

Weapon Charge

0.05

0.04

0.01

0.01

0.04

Detained

0.15

0.12

0.12

0.05

0.10

Warrant

0.00

0.00

-0.02

-0.01

0.02

Prior Arrests

0.27

0.18

0.19

0.10

0.21

Concurrent Arrests

0.14

0.07

0.09

0.07

0.08

Age at First Arrest

-0.21

-0.12

-0.13

-0.08

-0.17

0.09

0.13

0.06

0.07

0.04

Case Length

-0.11

-0.10

-0.08

-0.07

-0.07

Conviction

0.12

0.07

0.09

0.04

0.06

Custodial Sentence Length

0.04

0.04

-0.01

-0.03

0.02

-0.04

0.12

0.03

0.01

-0.10

Robbery
Aggravated Assault

Previously Incarcerated

State
* p < .05 shown in bold

